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Why Commodity Scarcity Is Becoming the Biggest Bottleneck for Clean-Tech Entrepreneurs

Anthony Milewski, The Oregon Group founder, writes for The Entrepreneur

Clean-tech startups are hitting a scaling wall because material supply, not technology or capital, is now the real constraint.

Key Takeaways

  • The energy transition is industrial, not digital, and moves at the pace of physical supply.
  • Just-in-time procurement fails when critical materials are scarce, slow and geopolitically constrained.

For the past decade, clean-tech entrepreneurship has been driven by a powerful assumption: that if the technology works and the capital is available, scale will follow. Better batteries, smarter grids, electric vehicles and cleaner power generation would naturally accelerate as innovation compounded.

What many founders are now discovering — often too late — is that the real constraint isn’t software, funding or even regulation. It’s materials.

The energy transition is not a digital transformation. It’s an industrial one. And industrial systems move at the pace of geology, permitting and physical supply chains — not pitch decks and product roadmaps.

The transition was planned for demand, not supply

Global decarbonization targets assumed that critical commodities — copper, lithium, nickel, graphite, rare earths, uranium — would simply be available when needed. That assumption shaped everything from EV adoption forecasts to grid-expansion plans.

But commodity supply does not respond like demand. You can’t spin up a copper mine or a processing facility in 18 months. Most take a decade or more from discovery to production. Years of underinvestment, coupled with rising geopolitical friction and permitting complexity, have left supply structurally behind demand.

The result is a widening gap between climate ambition and physical reality.

For entrepreneurs building hardware-dependent businesses, this gap is no longer abstract. It shows up as delayed projects, rising input costs, missed delivery timelines and margin pressure that no amount of software optimization can fix.

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Mining investment tightens as geopolitics and oversupply shape 2026 — Wood Mackenzie

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Global mining investment will be dominated by three main drivers in 2026: geopolitics, the energy transition, cautious capital investment, according to the latest report by Wood Mackenzie.

Specific events in particular that will set the tone of trade and growth (across tariffs, fiscal support and commodity demand) will be:

  • China’s 15th Five-Year-Plan in H1 2026
  • US mid-term elections in H2 2026

Despite pockets of demand strength, mining companies remain wary of committing capital amid policy shifts, trade friction, and uneven growth prospects. The risk backdrop will reinforce a preference for capital returns and M&A over greenfield builds.

What happens to metals demand in 2026?

Demand growth persists, but unevenly.

Copper stands out, with ongoing supply disruptions are expected to support copper prices, while gold and silver benefit from safe-haven flows and central bank buying amid macro uncertainty.

The energy transition continues despite political pushback, driven by electrification, renewable power deployment, and data-center power needs. However, Wood Mackenzie expects oversupply in many minerals to persist through 2026, keeping many prices capped.

Wildcards

The report highlights a number of “wildcards” that may create volatility in markets, including:

  • AI efficiency gains creating productivity improvements could either lift material demand via scale effects (Jevons paradox) or dampen consumption via thrifting and substitution
  • Battery materials face a similar fork, with 2026 likely clarifying whether solid-state batteries move closer to commercial reality
  • Peace in Ukraine would likely lift commodity sanctions across the board from Russia
  • State-led investment across commodity value chains would support majors finally greenlighting large-scale greenfield projects that have long been waiting in the wings

Growth, but with guardrails

Even where prices justify development, final investment decisions remain scarce. Resource nationalism, partner scrutiny by host governments, and trade barriers delay supply responses. Where capital does flow, it is more likely from smaller, agile players than majors, reinforcing a fragmented growth path  .

According to Wood Mackenzie, for investors and policymakers, 2026 looks less like a capex supercycle and more like a selective opportunity set. Geopolitics, discipline, and disruption — not demand alone — will decide returns.

Trump orders negotiations with foreign suppliers on critical mineral imports, warns tariffs if deals stall

US President Trump has signed an Executive Order directing US trade and commerce officials to begin talks with foreign suppliers to secure critical mineral imports, while warning that tariffs or other trade restrictions could follow “if such an agreement is not entered into within 180 days of the date of this proclamation”.

The order comes under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, after a government investigation concluded that current imports of processed critical minerals threaten national security.

Trump said the administration would not impose new tariffs immediately, opting instead for negotiations to adjust import volumes and conditions. However, the proclamation sets a 180-day deadline, after which the US could introduce minimum import prices, quotas, or tariffs if agreements are not reached.

Investigation flags America’s critical mineral import dependence

The Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation found the US was 100% net-import reliant on 12 critical minerals in 2024 and more than 50% reliant for a further 29, despite some domestic mining activity. The shortfall is most acute in processing and refining, which remains heavily concentrated overseas.

Processed critical minerals and derivative products are used across defence systems, power grids, electric vehicles, electronics and advanced manufacturing, the administration said, making supply disruptions a strategic risk.

China exposure in focus

Officials again pointed to China’s dominant position in global processing of rare earths and other strategic materials as a central vulnerability, particularly after Beijing tightened export controls on several critical inputs over the past year.

Trump said the US would seek alternative overseas supplies and deeper partnerships with allied producers, rather than rely on countries seen as geopolitical rivals.

Price mechanisms and trade risks

The Trump administration says negotiations could include price-based mechanisms, a signal that Washington may attempt to counter what it sees as market distortions from subsidised or state-backed production abroad.

The move coincides with Trump’s decision to extend the national emergency with respect to energy, preserving broad executive authority to address supply risks across energy and mineral markets.

Why it matters

By delaying tariffs, the administration avoids an immediate cost shock to US manufacturers dependent on imported inputs. But the 180-day clock introduces policy risk for exporters and clarity for allied suppliers positioned to benefit from new trade agreements.

Tokenized Assets: The Next Frontier For Corporate Treasuries

Over the past several years, tokenization has transformed from a niche technological experiment into a major development in global finance.

While much of the conversation has centered on retail investors, fractional ownership and new markets for hard assets like gold, I believe the next—and arguably far more consequential—chapter is unfolding inside corporate finance departments.

I see the corporate treasury, traditionally one of the most conservative functions inside any company, as on the brink of a structural shift. As tokenized commodities and real assets become widely available through regulated digital rails, treasurers seem poised to begin holding these assets directly—just as they hold cash, currency hedges and short-term securities today.

The infrastructure for this is already being built, making the incentives for corporations to adopt tokenized assets clear.

The Treasury Problem Nobody Wants To Discuss

Corporate treasuries face a problem that has quietly been growing for years: The global economy is becoming more volatile while traditional hedging tools have not evolved to match the speed of modern commerce.

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US plans $2.7 billion investment to restore uranium enrichment

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  • US Department of Energy awards $2.7 billion to restart domestic uranium enrichment after decades of decline
  • the move targets HALEU fuel, now critical for next-generation nuclear reactors and defense applications
  • US currently relies heavily on Russia-linked enrichment services
  • enrichment capacity, not uranium mining, is now the tightest bottleneck in the US nuclear fuel cycle

The US US Department of Energy has awarded US$2.7 billion to restore American uranium enrichment capacity, largely abandoned three decades ago, aiming to reduce reliance on foreign — and increasingly adversarial — suppliers.

The funding will support commercial-scale enrichment, early deployment of advanced centrifuge technology, and the production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) — fuel enriched between 5% and 20% U-235. HALEU is essential for most advanced reactor designs now backed by US policy and capital.

US uranium supply to commercial nuclear reactors 1950 2023 - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

Why enrichment is the weak link in the uranium supply chain

The US once dominated uranium enrichment. That system collapsed in the 1990s as cheap Russian supply flooded global markets under the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. Today, the US has no commercial HALEU enrichment capacity and only limited conventional enrichment, according to the DOE.

Globally, enrichment is concentrated. Russia’s state-owned Rosatom controls an estimated 40% of global enrichment capacity. The United States imports 20-25% of its enriched uranium from Russia. Even after sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, Russian material continues to flow into Western fuel cycles under waivers and exemptions.

For the US, that dependence has become untenable. Advanced reactors backed by federal loan guarantees, Pentagon contracts, and Big Tech power purchase agreements cannot proceed without assured domestic fuel supply.

“President Trump is catalyzing a resurgence in the nation’s nuclear energy sector to strengthen American security and prosperity,” said US Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright. “Today’s awards show that this Administration is committed to restoring a secure domestic nuclear fuel supply chain capable of producing the nuclear fuels needed to power the reactors of today and the advanced reactors of tomorrow.”

What Is HALEU — and why it matters now

HALEU is not a niche product. The majority of next-generation reactors — including small modular reactors (SMRs), microreactors, and fast reactors — require it. The DOE estimates initial US demand for HALEU could reach tens of tonnes per year by the early 2030s, scaling sharply thereafter.

Projects from companies like TerraPower and X-energy are already delayed by fuel availability. Without domestic enrichment, the US would be forced to source HALEU from Russia — the only commercial supplier today — or delay reactor deployment indefinitely.

Inside the DOE plan — rebuilding the fuel cycle

The US$2.7 billion award is part of a broader effort to rebuild the entire US nuclear fuel supply chain — from conversion and enrichment to fabrication. The DOE’s HALEU programs support:

  • commercial-scale centrifuge enrichment
  • demonstration of advanced enrichment technologies
  • long-term contracts to anchor private investment

The following companies were awarded task orders totaling $2.7 billion to provide enrichment services for LEU and HALEU:

  • American Centrifuge Operating ($900 million) to create domestic HALEU enrichment capacity
  • General Matter ($900 million) to create domestic HALEU enrichment capacity 
  • Orano Federal Services ($900 million) to expand U.S. domestic LEU enrichment capacity

The strategy mirrors earlier US interventions in semiconductors and rare earths: public capital to de-risk infrastructure the market cannot rebuild alone.

Crucially, this funding is structured to catalyze private capital, not replace it. Enrichment is capital-intensive, regulated, and politically sensitive. Without government support, the economics simply do not clear.

Why this fits the bigger nuclear reset

The enrichment push sits within a wider nuclear revival. Global nuclear capacity is set to expand as governments chase firm, low-carbon power. The US alone has committed billions in loan guarantees, tax credits, and direct support for reactors, fuel, and supply chains.

As previously outlined in our Nuclear Energy Is Back analysis the bottleneck is no longer demand. It is execution — and fuel availability is at the center of that challenge.

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How tokenization could transform investments and industries

The last decade brought crypto, which fundamentally changed how we think about money and settlement. Now, the next great shift—tokenization—is upon us.

Digital wallets, which are already routine for many of us, are paving the way. Bank of America recently reported that by 2026, more than 5.3 billion people will use digital wallets—over half of the global population. That sheer scale is why I see wallets not just as a payment convenience, but as the infrastructure layer for tokenized assets, including commodities and equities.

From everyday payments to tokenized value

The pandemic accelerated a shift that had been building for years. Consumers who once resisted digital payments began using wallets. Now, nearly 90% of smartphone owners send or receive money through wallet-enabled apps, according to Bank of America.

Tokenization sits at the core of this technology. Digital wallets transmit secure aliases, or tokens, instead of sensitive account numbers. That same process, which today makes paying for coffee safer, will soon support tokenized assets—whether that’s a share of stock, gold, a carbon credit, or a royalty or stream.

In other words, digital wallets are teaching billions of people how to interact with tokenized value, and are becoming the user interface for the tokenized economy. Here are four major ways tokenization will transform investments and industries.

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US-backed $7.4bn smelter escalates critical minerals decoupling from China

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  • US has backed a $7.4bn critical minerals smelter to be built by Korea Zinc, the world’s largest zinc smelter
  • facility, planned for Tennessee, will process antimony, gallium, germanium, zinc, copper, lead, precious metals, and rare earths
  • commercial production expected to ramp between 2027 and 2029

The US has thrown its weight behind a US$7.4bn critical minerals processing plant to be built by Korea Zinc, underscoring how refining and smelting — not just mining — have become a key strategic battleground in the global minerals race.

Korea Zinc confirmed that the US government requested the facility to address mounting supply-chain risks for metals essential to industries ranging from automotive and electronics to defence systems. The move comes as Washington steps up efforts to counter China’s dominance across downstream processing, where Beijing controls large shares of global refining capacity for multiple strategic metals.

This is not a marginal project. It is one of the largest foreign investments in US critical minerals infrastructure to date—and a clear signal that the US is now willing to deploy capital, policy tools, and allies to rebuild industrial capacity it allowed to atrophy for decades.

Crucially: China accounts for approximately 85% of global critical mineral processing capacity.

Refining concentration by geography and ownership 2024 - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

What will the smelter produce — and why it matters

According to regulatory filings and disclosures, the Tennessee facility will produce a wide slate of materials, including antimony, gallium, and germanium, alongside zinc, copper, lead, precious metals such as gold and silver, and rare earth elements.

As have highlighted in our analysis, these are not niche metals:

  • antimony is critical for flame retardants, ammunition, and military alloys
  • gallium and germanium are essential inputs for semiconductors, power electronics, radar systems, and infrared optics
  • zinc and copper underpin everything from grid infrastructure to EV charging networks

China currently dominates the processing of many of these materials and has placed strict export controls on several, including germanium and gallium, over the past two years. That reality has forced US policymakers to confront an uncomfortable truth: domestic mining means little without secure downstream capacity.

Project structure: public capital, private execution

Korea Zinc’s board has approved the formation of a foreign joint venture that will include the US government, an unusually direct level of state involvement for a metals processing project.

The JV is expected to raise around $2bn, with the remainder of funding coming from a mix of US government loans, grants, and capital contributions from Korea Zinc. The company plans to acquire and redevelop a Nyrstar-owned smelting site in Tennessee, upgrading it to produce 13 different metals and sulphuric acid used in chipmaking.

Target output levels are substantial:

  • 300,000 tonnes of zinc per year
  • 35,000 tonnes of copper
  • 200,000 tonnes of lead
  • 5,100 tonnes of rare earths annually 

Commercial operations are expected to begin gradually between 2027 and 2029, placing the project squarely within the window when analysts expect structural deficits in multiple critical minerals to intensify.

Why Korea Zinc — and why now?

Korea Zinc is the world’s largest zinc smelter and a producer of several materials already under Chinese export controls, including antimony, indium, tellurium, cadmium, and germanium.

The project also follows a broader South Korea–US economic realignment. In late October, Seoul agreed to invest US$350bn in the US as part of a trade deal aimed at reducing tariffs and strengthening strategic supply chains. Korea Zinc’s chair was part of a senior South Korean business delegation to Washington earlier this year, highlighting the political weight behind the investment.

Markets reacted quickly. Korea Zinc shares jumped as much as 27% following local media reports of the agreement, reflecting investor recognition that state-aligned processing assets now command strategic premiums.

The Bigger Picture: From Mining Security to Industrial Sovereignty

This project reinforces a critical shift in US policy thinking. The focus is no longer just on securing upstream supply, but on rebuilding industrial sovereignty across the entire value chain.

Smelters are expensive, politically sensitive, environmentally complex, and slow to permit — precisely why China dominates them. By underwriting a $7.4bn facility with an allied operator, the US is signalling that processing capacity is now a national-security asset, not just an industrial one.

Find out more from our analysis on how refining is the chokepoint:

(Photo credit: Korea Zinc)

How Tokenization Is Changing Commodity Valuation Models

Tokenization is reshaping conversations about access, liquidity and transparency in the commodity markets. In a previous article, I explored why this shift matters strategically, who should participate and how.

But I think what has received less attention is its impact on valuation itself. When the underlying market mechanics of commodities evolve, the very way investors price those commodities must evolve too.

Tether Gold, a token, now reportedly owns nearly $12 billion in gold. With gold sitting at or near all-time highs, you have to wonder what the impact of this and similar gold tokens has had on the physical market and what it means for the tokenization of other commodities.

Liquidity As A Valuation Variable

Traditional commodity valuation models assume illiquidity as a constant. Oil, copper or nickel may trade on exchanges, but physical ownership—warehouse receipts, offtake contracts or royalties—does not. Investors demand an “illiquidity discount” for holding real assets that are difficult to sell, finance or verify.

Tokenization collapses that discount. When a physical asset can be represented by a compliant, verifiable token and traded frictionlessly across global markets, the cost of liquidity declines and valuations rise accordingly.

Consider how this played out with Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). Once an asset became easy to own and sell, investors paid a premium for convenience and accessibility. Tokenized commodities should follow the same trajectory, with liquidity itself becoming a driver of return.

Price Discovery In Continuous Markets

Commodities have historically been priced through centralized exchanges and bilateral contracts—systems that close each afternoon and reopen the next day. Tokenized assets, however, never sleep.

A 24/7 market means price discovery becomes continuous. A nickel token held in wallets across Asia, Europe and North America could trade in real time based on regional demand, foreign exchange shifts or even social sentiment. That constant feedback loop compresses arbitrage opportunities, making prices more reflective of global supply and demand conditions.

For portfolio managers, this creates both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge: Volatility will increase as markets digest information around the clock. The opportunity: Price accuracy improves. The “closing price” becomes less meaningful than the aggregated digital footprint of trades across geographies and time zones.

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The next energy shock won’t be oil — it’ll be critical minerals, warns IEA

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Key takeaways

  • China refines 70% of 20 strategic energy minerals and leads production in 19 of them
  • Half of all strategic minerals now subject to export controls, up sharply since 2023
  • Copper faces a 30% supply shortfall by 2035, even as nickel and cobalt supply catches up
  • Price volatility for three-quarters of critical minerals now exceeds that of crude oil

The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2025 redefines energy security for the electric age: not oil or gas, but critical minerals are now the system’s fault line. The report’s central message is clear — the energy transition’s raw material foundation is dangerously concentrated, geopolitically exposed, and still tightening.

Top three supplying countries of selected critical minerals and clean technologies 2020 and 2024 - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

Concentration worsens despite global push for diversification

Refining of critical minerals has become more concentrated since 2020, not less, according to the IEA:

  • the top three refining nations now control 86% of global capacity, up from 82% four years ago
  • China the dominant refiner for 19 out of 20 energy related strategic minerals, with an average market share of around 70%
  • and China holds over 80% of global battery supply chain capacity across every stage, from anodes to cells

Top refiner share of selected energy related strategic minerals by country - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

Even under the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), concentration barely improves by 2035, declining only to 82%, effectively back to 2020 levels. This means diversification efforts remain mostly symbolic without significant new refining investment outside Asia.

The global energy system requires the extraction of vast quantities of materials from fossil fuels to critical minerals. The total weight of useful products for the energy system was estimated at 17 billion tonnes in 2024. Even larger quantities of material are extracted to deliver these useful products.

The minerals in question are vital for power grids, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs), but they also play a crucial role in AI chips, jet engines, defence systems and other strategic industries.

Raw material extraction of fossil fuels and critical minerals by scenario 2000 2050 - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

Export controls are the new geopolitical leverage

The IEA identifies 2025 as the turning point when “the risks that we identified in 2021 are no longer a theoretical concern; they have become a hard reality.”

By November 2025, more than half of all strategic minerals were under some form of export control.

China’s moves were pivotal:

  • April 2025: export controls on seven heavy rare earths and compounds
  • October 2025: expanded to include five more elements and even assemblies or products containing Chinese-sourced materials. These restrictions triggered a 75% drop in rare earth magnet exports in Q2 2025, forcing automakers in the US and EU to idle production and sending European rare earth prices to six times higher than China’s domestic levels

Top producer monthly price volatility trade restrictions exposure and status as by product of select strategic minerals - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

“Many countries are turning to more diversified or home-grown energy sources to reduce exposure to geopolitical risk. At the same time, energy and material exports are increasingly being used as instruments of foreign policy. Alongside the expansion of global trade, there has been a notable rise in the use of trade measures as geopolitical tools, including restrictions on materials and access to technologies” — IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025

Impact Snapshot:

A 10% disruption in Chinese rare earth exports could halt production of 6.2 million cars or 650 AI data centers, the IEA warns.

Copper and lithium shortfalls loom

While new projects have improved medium-term supply for lithium, nickel, and cobalt, the IEA highlights copper as the critical bottleneck.

Under current policy settings, the world faces a 30% copper supply shortfall by 2035, driven by declining ore grades, long permitting timelines, and limited new discoveries.

Lithium remains better positioned with strong project pipelines in Australia, Chile, and North America, but refining remains highly concentrated. China refines 75% of purified phosphoric acid and 95% of manganese sulphate, two key inputs for next-generation LFP and manganese-rich batteries.

Key 2035 supply risks

  • copper: –30% shortfall
  • lithium: Tight but improving supply
  • cobalt/Nickel: Stable if projects proceed
  • graphite/rare earths: Severely exposed to supply shocks

Price volatility and “By-Product Dependence” create structural fragility

Three-quarters of the 20 minerals tracked by the IEA are now more volatile than crude oil, with half exceeding even natural gas volatility.

For many — such as tantalum, titanium, vanadium, and indium — production is tied to by-products from other mining streams, limiting flexibility to meet rising demand.

That means when supply is disrupted, new capacity can’t simply be ramped up — and substitution options are limited or technologically unproven.

Investment response

The United States is emerging as the most aggressive in addressing these supply chain vulnerabilities, according to the IEA. The Department of Energy and Defense are deploying loan guarantees and offtake-backed financing under the Defense Production Act and Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative.

Recent deals include the Pentagon’s long-term offtake and price floor agreement with MP Materials, aiming to anchor a domestic rare earth magnet supply chain. Still, global refining and midstream investment remain far below what’s required. The IEA warns that “market forces alone will not deliver diversification.”

Why it matters

The IEA’s message is unmistakable: the next phase of the energy transition won’t be defined by the speed of renewable buildout but by the availability of the metals that make it possible.

If current trends persist, even a minor supply disruption could trigger battery price spikes of 40–50%, undermining EV economics and slowing the global decarbonisation agenda.

“While the market sizes for these strategic minerals are relatively small compared with bulk materials, disruptions in their supply can nevertheless have outsized economic impacts. For example, a 10% disruption in rare earth magnet exports could affect the production of 6.2 million conventional cars, or almost 1 million industrial motors, or 230 000 civilian aircraft, or the construction of over 650 hyper-scale AI data centres” — IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025

  • the IEA forecasts USD$900 billion clean tech market (batteries, solar, wind, EVs)
  • disruptions in metal supply could wipe out years of cost reductions
  • supply diversification projects, especially in North America, Australia, and Africa, are set to attract a surge of capital seeking geopolitical hedges

Conclusion

The World Energy Outlook 2025 reframes energy security as mineral security.

Copper, lithium, rare earths, and graphite now play the role oil once did in the 1970s, strategic resources vulnerable to coercion and shock.

The IEA’s call is blunt: without deliberate policy coordination, strategic stockpiles, and diversified refining, the next energy crisis will be measured not in barrels, but in tonnes of minerals.

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China lifts export ban gallium, germanium, antimony

  • China suspends export ban on three critical minerals — gallium, germanium and antimony
  • Beijing frames controls as national-security licensing, not a permanent ban, signalling strategic flexibility rather than supply-chain guarantee

China has suspended the export ban on gallium, germanium and antimony to US until November 27, 2026. Exports will now be managed under licensing until 27 November 2026, but the clause banning exports to military end-users remains in effect.

The move comes after a wider trade truce between China and the US after a meeting between US President Donald Trump and President Xi on November 1.

Chinese state-media commentary emphasises that export controls are normal regulatory practice for dual-use items and the re-opening is aligned with international norms.

In December 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) announced that “in principle” exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and super-hard materials to the US would not be permitted.  The ban was a direct retaliation to US semiconductor export restrictions and a signal of Beijing’s willingness to use critical‐mineral control as leverage. 

Sources of gallium and germanium imported into US - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence

China dominates the production and processing the gallium, germanium and antimony:

Why it matters for critical-minerals supply chains

report, released in November, by the US Geological Survey, warned there could be a US$3.4 to 9 billion decrease in US GDP if China implements a total ban on exports of gallium and germanium, minerals used in some semiconductors and other high-tech manufacturing:

  • gallium is used in high-frequency semiconductors, 5G, LEDs and photovoltaics
  • germanium is critical for fibre optics, infrared sensors and advanced chips
  • antimony is deployed in flame retardants, batteries, aerospace, and defence alloys

While the ban is suspended, export licensing remains, and the military‐end-use ban stays active. That means Beijing retains the ability to re-activate stricter controls. Chinese media explicitly say export controls are lawful regulatory tools, not ad-hoc trade weapons. 

What remains unresolved and what to watch

  • licensing volumes and destinations: How many shipments are approved under the new regime, and to which end-users? Transparent data is limited
  • duration and durability: the suspension runs until 27 Nov 2026, after which Beijing can flip the switch again. Markets should price for optionality, not certainty
  • broader export-control architecture: China’s rare-earth export mechanism (eg, heavy rare earths, downstream alloys) remains only partly eased; full liberalisation has not occurred 
  • sSmuggling/enforcement risk: as noted by Chinese authorities, trans-shipment and third-country routing are expanding — enforcement and licensing transparency will matter

This decision marks a tactical thaw in one of the most acute chokepoints of global critical-minerals supply chains. However, the strategic dependency remains: China still retains the upstream leverage.

In conclusion: the ban’s suspension is meaningful — but it isn’t a guarantee of open supply. The upstream remains tilted toward China; investors and policymakers should view the move as a reprieve, not a resolution.

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