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India bans lithium-ion battery black mass exports to keep lithium, cobalt and nickel at home

 

India has banned exports of lithium-ion battery black mass, the shredded battery powder that contains lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese. The aim is to force recyclers to refine those critical minerals at home rather than ship them to refiners in China and South Korea.

The Directorate General of Foreign Trade changed the export status of black mass from “free” to “prohibited” in Notification No. 49/2026-27 on November 10. The order covers unsorted battery waste and scrap that contains no lead, cadmium or mercury, under HS code 85491400.

It is not a blanket ban on battery exports, applying only to that waste category, so refined metals and salts are not covered by the order — but the timing is deliberate.

On November 4, the Union Cabinet approved a 30% capital subsidy for four processing plants: two lithium plants of at least 30,000 tonnes a year each and two nickel plants of at least 50,000 tonnes each. Support is capped at US$53 million (₹500 crore) per lithium plant and US$96 million (₹900 crore) per nickel plant.

The policy is meant to reduce India’s reliance on supply chains dominated by China, with the government saings the ban will assure feedstock availability for domestic recycling and refining units and improve their capacity utilisation.

Bar chart of India's annual lithium-ion battery black mass capacity and estimated output: shredding capacity nearly 70,000 tonnes (industry association data cited by EVreporter, October 2025); refining capacity about 60,000 tonnes, of which Attero says 15,000 tonnes and Rubamin says 10,000 tonnes; estimated output 5,000-6,000 tonnes (Lohum founder Rajat Verma, February 2024). A footnote notes Indian Express, citing government data in November 2026, put companies' black mass processing input capacity at about 75,500 tonnes a year.

India’s refiners are short of feed

India’s battery shredders can produce nearly 70,000 tonnes of black mass a year, and its refiners can process about 60,000 tonnes, according to industry association data cited by EVreporter in October 2025. Indian Express, citing government data, has since put companies’ input capacity for processing lithium-ion battery black mass at about 75,500 tonnes a year.

However, most plants run well below capacity because they cannot get enough spent batteries. Attero says it can refine up to 15,000 tonnes a year and Rubamin 10,000 tonnes. So, actual output is far lower. In February 2024, Lohum’s founder estimated India’s black mass production at 400 to 500 tonnes a month, or roughly 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes a year. That is less than a tenth of domestic refining capacity, so the ban is less about the tonnes India keeps than about deciding who gets to process them.

Black mass is becoming a controlled commodity

India is not acting alone.

Timeline of lithium-ion battery black mass trade policy: on 1 August 2025 China allowed free imports of black mass that meets its quality standards; on 10 November 2026 India banned exports of unsorted lithium-ion battery black mass; on 9 December 2026 EU hazardous-waste rules start, classifying black mass as hazardous and banning exports to countries outside the OECD, such as China.

This all matters because it highlights how countries that lack mines are starting to treat scrap batteries like ore. China is trying to pull in recycled feed, while Europe, the US and now India are locking it inside their borders. For refiners outside China, that means more competition for a feedstock that used to move freely to whoever paid the most.

Conclusion

The losers are India’s shredders, who make up an estimated +80% of the country’s lithium-ion recycling industry, but are paid better prices by overseas refiners, with some claim Indian refineries paying about 2% less. Industry voices have warned that the shift could hand pricing power to a few domestic refiners.

There is also a gap further down the chain. India has practically no production of cathode active material, according to battery expert Dr SRS Prabaharan, so the cobalt and nickel salts its refiners recover may still have to be sold abroad. Enforcement has been a problem too: in 2025 customs officials were alerted to shredders exporting black mass under the wrong trade codes.

Unless India builds cathode plants that can use the lithium, nickel and cobalt its refiners recover, the ban may just move the export point one step down the value chain, from black mass to metal salts.

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Yttrium oxide costs x125 more in Europe than China as export restrictions split the rare earths market

 

Yttrium oxide now costs at least x125 more in Europe than in China, as Beijing’s export restrictions on heavy rare earths split the market in two.

A metric tonne of the oxide costs about US$1.15 million in Europe, compared with US$9,144 in China, according to Argus Media prices reported by Bloomberg. Supplies inside China remain substantial and, before the curbs, prices around the world were only slightly higher than in China.

The gap comes after China extended its pause on a wider set of rare earth export controls until January 10, 2027 — but that extension does not touch the metals behind the price gap. Controls introduced in April 2025 on samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium remain in effect, and exporters still need a licence.

How wide is the gap?

The price difference may be even higher, with Benchmark putting North American yttrium oxide at about x196 the Chinese price at the end of September 2026.

Dysprosium, which keeps magnets working at high temperatures, shows a similar split: on November 5, Shanghai Metals Market quoted European dysprosium oxide at US$3,300-4,200/kg, against US$215-220/kg in China, about x15 to x19. Benchmark had already put European dysprosium oxide at around x16.3 the Chinese price at the end of September, up from x6.8 at the end of June.

The chart below shows those multiples, by source and date:

Horizontal bar chart of prices outside China as a multiple of the Chinese price: yttrium oxide CIF North America x196 (Benchmark, end-September 2026); yttrium oxide Europe x125 (Argus Media via Bloomberg, 10 November 2026); dysprosium oxide Europe x17.2 (SMM midpoint, 5 November 2026) and x16.3 (Benchmark, end-September 2026).

In North America, the story is the same, with Platts, part of S&P Global Energy, assessing dysprosium oxide in North America at US$4,100/kg on October 30, up from US$1,200/kg when the assessment was launched on March 31. Terbium oxide rose from US$4,900/kg to US$8,100/kg over the same period, and samarium oxide from US$175/kg to US$1,200/kg.

The chart below shows those Platts assessments on March 31 and October 30:

Paired bar chart of Platts CIF North America rare earth oxide prices in US dollars per kilogram: dysprosium oxide US$1,200 on 31 March 2026 and US$4,100 on 30 October 2026; terbium oxide US$4,900 and US$8,100; samarium oxide US$175 and US$1,200.

The prices reflect a real shortage of material, not just speculation.

China exported 934 tonnes of yttrium oxide in January-September 2026, 26% less than a year earlier, according to customs data reported by Kyodo. Only 18 tonnes went to Japan, down 98% from 887 tonnes in the same period of 2025. Mysteel, citing the General Administration of Customs, recorded 110.061 tonnes in September alone.

The chart below shows China’s yttrium oxide exports to Japan in the first nine months of 2025 and 2026:

Bar chart of China's yttrium oxide exports to Japan in January-September: 887 tonnes in 2025 and 18 tonnes in 2026, down 98%. China's total yttrium oxide exports in January-September 2026 were 934 tonnes, down 26% on the year. Source: Chinese customs via Kyodo and Mysteel.

Why yttrium matters

Yttrium is used in semiconductors and coats the blades of gas and jet-engine turbines, so the squeeze reaches across defence, aerospace and the power supply for artificial intelligence data centres.

Most mined yttrium still comes from China, despite efforts by the US to support a secure, ex-China supply. For example, Lynas Rare Earths is expanding heavy rare earth production at its Malaysian plant, but yttrium is sequenced after gadolinium and is not yet in production.

Project Blue research director David Merriman warned that little relief is coming soon:

“Within the next year or two, really there is very limited ex-China supply which is going to be available”

The Pentagon’s ban on Chinese rare earths in defence supply chains starts on January 1, and the US has already warned Beijing that it has delivered only two-thirds of its commitments. Japan has already seen the squeeze, as we reported.

The price signal cuts both ways

The squeeze is in heavy rare earths, not the whole market.

Outside China, prices for praseodymium-neodymium oxide, the main light rare earth used in magnets, fell below the US$110/kg floor set in MP Materials’ and Lynas’s agreements with the US Department of Defense during the third quarter, as producers outside China redirected volumes into an oversupplied market.

High heavy rare earth prices may also attract new supply. Benchmark’s forecasters say the premium outside China on dysprosium and terbium is “the economic signal required to bring new heavy rare earth capacity online”.

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Alphamin’s Bisie tin mine to feed first US tin smelter since 1989

 

Alphamin Resources has agreed to supply up to 3,600 metric tonnes of contained tin a year from its Bisie mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Nathan Trotter & Co., which is building the first US tin smelter in more than three decades.

The deal comes as Washington backs domestic processing of critical minerals, with tin trading at about US$46,000 a tonne on the London Metal Exchange on Monday, November 9.

The allocation runs for an initial two years and represents just under 20% of Bisie’s targeted production — Bisie, which Alphamin describes as the world’s highest-grade primary tin mine, currently produces about 20,000 tonnes of contained tin a year.

The concentrate is destined for Tin Ridge, a 115,000-square-foot plant in Henry County, Virginia, designed to refine both tin concentrate and scrap. It is still under construction, with first production targeted for 2027.

Why a US tin smelter matters

The US has not mined tin since 1993 or smelted it since 1989. In 2025, it imported an estimated 32,000 tonnes of refined tin, and net imports met 77% of apparent consumption. Peru, Bolivia, Indonesia and Brazil supplied most of those imports between 2021 and 2024.

The chart below shows US refined tin consumption, refined imports and tin recovered from scrap since 2021:

Bar chart: US apparent refined tin consumption, refined tin imports and tin recovered from old scrap, 2021 to 2025, with net import reliance of 77% in 2025. Source: US Geological Survey.

Before smelting losses, the full allocation would equal roughly a ninth of 2025 refined imports, our calculations show — and that matters because tin goes into solder for electronics and defence equipment, and Washington has already backed the project: the Pentagon awarded Nathan Trotter US$19 million under the Defense Production Act in September 2024 to build domestic tin smelting, refining and recycling capacity.

Meanwhile, Nathan Trotter is building a feedstock pipeline: the Alphamin deal follows a September agreement to buy up to 100% of Huntore Australia’s tin concentrate from its Mount Garnet operations in Far North Queensland, which are expected to produce up to 3,000 tonnes of tin concentrate a year.

The ownership is notable too, after Abu Dhabi’s International Resources Holding bought 56% of Alphamin in July 2025 and supports the deal. Alphamin links it to Pax Silica, the US-led supply-chain initiative launched in December 2025, which the United Arab Emirates joined in January 2026.

It also adds an alternative at a time when Asian supply is tight, as we reported when Indonesia’s refined tin exports fell 18% in September.

Prices reflect that tightness with London Metal Exchange cash tin peaked at US$57,525 a tonne on June 2 and settled at US$46,350 on November 9, still above any level reached in 2025.

Line chart: London Metal Exchange tin cash-settlement price, January 2021 to November 9, 2026. It peaked at US$57,525 a tonne on June 2, 2026 and was US$46,350 on November 9, 2026. Source: LME data via Westmetall.

Most of Bisie’s tin will still go to China

The deal diversifies a slice of Bisie’s output, but it does not redirect the mine. About 70% of Alphamin’s concentrate is sold to Yunnan in China because of competitive treatment charges, and most will keep going there, chief executive Eoin O’Driscoll told Fastmarkets in October.

He framed the US deal as diversification rather than a break with Chinese smelters: “The east will continue to refine the majority of the world’s tin, but diversification is good for us and good for everybody,” Eoin O’Driscoll said.

China was the largest tin miner in 2025, at an estimated 71,000 tonnes, and Yunnan Tin was the world’s largest refined tin producer in 2024, at 85,000 tonnes.

Congo ranked fifth among tin-mining countries in 2025 with an estimated 27,000 tonnes, behind China, Indonesia, Peru and Brazil, as the chart below shows.

Bar chart: world tin mine production by country in 2025, led by China at 71,000 tonnes and Indonesia at 61,000 tonnes, with Congo fifth at 27,000 tonnes. Source: US Geological Survey.

Potential disruptions to the deal

The deal may have been agreed but there’s still a journey between the contract and the pipeline itself, including:

The deal gives the US a credible source of high-grade concentrate for its first tin smelter in decades, but until Tin Ridge is running, most of Congo’s best tin will still be refined in China.

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Rare Earth export controls: China extends pause to January 10 ahead of Trump-Xi talks

  • China extends its suspension of the October 2025 rare-earth and battery export controls to January 10, 2027, a day before the pause was due to end on November 10
  • the six suspended measures include licences for five more rare earths and a rule that would require Chinese approval for foreign-made magnets containing 0.1% or more Chinese-origin rare earths by value
  • China’s April 2025 licences on seven medium and heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and yttrium, are not affected, and spot dysprosium oxide in Europe was quoted at US$3,300-4,200 a kilogram on November 5, against US$215-220 a kilogram in China

 

China has extended its pause on the most sweeping of its rare earth export controls to January 10, 2027, one day before the suspension was due to run out.

The Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs said in Announcement No. 58 of 2026, published on Monday, that six measures announced in October 2025 will stay suspended from November 11 until January 10. The one-line notice gave no other details.

The decision brings China’s legal text into line with the wider US-China trade truce, which both sides already said would run to January 10 after Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington in September. Yesterday, the US warned China  it must immediately meet its trade commitments, after US officials said Beijing was fulfilling only about two-thirds of its rare-earth pledge.

China exports of rare earth yttrium to the US - The Oregon Group

What stays suspended

The six measures that stay on hold until January 10 cover:

 

Arguably, the 0.1% rule matters most for Western manufacturers as it would reach magnet makers in Japan, Europe or the US that use any meaningful amount of Chinese material, even if the finished magnet never passes through China.

Bar chart: in 2024 China accounted for 60% of mined magnet rare earths, 91% of refined output and 94% of sintered magnet production. Source: IEA.

Part of a wider package

The rare earth notice was one of several Chinese moves on Monday to keep the truce in place, including:

China’s State Council Tariff Commission said it would keep suspending its extra 24% tariff on US goods for two months from 13:01 Beijing time on November 10, while keeping a 10% tariff in place.

Meanwhile, the Commerce Ministry said it would extend for two months its suspension of measures against 16 US companies on its export control list and 11 US companies on its unreliable entity list, its blacklist of foreign firms seen as harming Chinese interests.

Washington has made a matching move, with the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security has extended its own pause to January 10, 2027 on a rule that would have extended US export restrictions to companies at least 50% owned by blacklisted firms, many of them Chinese.

What has not changed

However, the extension removes a deadline, not a shortage.

China’s April 2025 licences on seven medium and heavy rare earths (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium) were never part of the pause and still require a permit for every shipment — helping to drive up prices heavy rare-earth prices outside China far above those inside it; for example, on November 5, spot dysprosium oxide in Europe was quoted at US$3,300-4,200 a kilogram, against US$215-220 a kilogram in China, while terbium oxide in Europe reached US$7,300-8,300 a kilogram.

Bar chart: on November 5, 2026 spot dysprosium oxide was quoted at US$3,300-4,200 a kilogram in Europe against US$215-220 in China. Source: Shanghai Metals Market.

Washington says Beijing is still falling short. Last Friday, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer pressed Vice Premier He Lifeng on “concrete actions” on “agricultural purchases, rare earths, and other critical minerals”, after US officials told the Financial Times that China was meeting only about two-thirds of its rare-earth pledge.

As we reported, the US warned China over rare earths after Beijing delivered only two-thirds of its commitments, and Japan has already seen China’s yttrium oxide exports to it fall 97.7% in January-May.

The next deadlines

Monday’s notice moves the deadline, but the calendar is still crowded:

 

What it means for investors

For magnet makers, battery companies and chip-equipment buyers outside China, the extension removes the risk of a sudden widening of licence requirements this week, which should ease pressure on supply contracts signed for early 2027.

The bigger signal is that China is now renewing (for now) its concessions in two-month steps, not one-year blocks, which keeps Beijing’s leverage close at hand for every round of talks, and gives Western buyers only a short planning window each time.

Beijing can do this because it still controls most of the chain: China accounted for 60% of mined magnet rare earths, 91% of refined output and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production in 2024.

Companies such as MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths, Energy Fuels and USA Rare Earth are selling into a market where buyers now have to plan around a renewal date every few months, while the April 2025 heavy rare-earth licences stay in place.

Potential risks and disruptions

  • the notice is a single line with no detail, so China could still slow approvals for the five newer rare earths and the related equipment once the pause ends, or tie a further extension to US concessions at APEC or later
  • the January 10 date could be extended again, or replaced by a longer deal, which would reduce the premium buyers are paying for non-Chinese supply
  • heavy rare-earth prices in Europe are thinly traded quotes; Shanghai Metals Market (SMM) itself says dysprosium, terbium and gadolinium often have “prices but no available goods”, so they may not reflect what large buyers actually pay

 

China has bought itself two more months of leverage, and Western buyers two more months of uncertainty. The price gap on dysprosium shows the market is still paying for that uncertainty.

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Canada antimony mining gains proposed 30% exploration tax credit

 

Canada’s federal budget proposes adding antimony to the metals that qualify for its 30% Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit and extending the credit by five years to 2032, potentially giving explorers a stronger tool to fund the hunt for a metal Canada does not currently mine.

The proposal comes after warnings that, by 2030, antimony smelters outside China will be able to meet only 73% of projected ex-China demand — and that’s only if every project currently announced is built.

Antimony supply demand balance outside of China and Russia - The Oregon Group

Western manufacturers are seeking more secure sources of antimony, critical across ammunition, semi-conductors, military equipment, batteries and flame retardants.

The budget also proposes extending that credit and the separate 15% Mineral Exploration Tax Credit to eligible agreements signed through March 31, 2032; both currently expire on March 31, 2027.

How big is antimony mining in Canada?

Canada’s immediate opportunity is to rebuild an industry rather than expand a large operating base — currently the country’s mine output of antimony in 2025 was zero, meaning it contributed nothing to the estimated global total of 110,000 tonnes that year.

Canada has 78,000 metric tonnes of antimony reserves, but recorded no mine production in 2025.

Beaver Brook in Newfoundland and Labrador describes itself as Canada’s only primary antimony mine, but its operator confirms the site is on care and maintenance, with mining and processing stopped.

The US Geological Survey’s national reserve estimate establishes that Canada has identified antimony in the ground, as exploration companies are working to define additional opportunities and establish which deposits can support future development.

Antimony already appears on Canada’s list of 34 critical minerals, and the budget proposal would connect that strategic recognition to the higher-rate exploration incentive.

The mechanism is straightforward. Flow-through shares allow companies to transfer eligible exploration expenses to investors, who can deduct them when calculating taxable income. The exploration credit provides an additional benefit for eligible individuals financing qualifying grassroots exploration. For junior miners without operating revenue, that can make a fundraising more attractive and support drilling, geological work and technical progress.

Canada’s untapped antimony potential

A national assessment published in FACETS identifies Nova Scotia, Yukon, British Columbia and New Brunswick as particularly promising areas for antimony exploration; and the publisher’s summary also highlights recovering antimony from old mine waste across several provinces and territories.

This creates several routes to new supply:

  • dedicated antimony deposits
  • recovery alongside gold or other metals
  • and reprocessing material already mined

Better geological mapping and metallurgical work can help companies identify which route offers the strongest economics. For example:

Canada is building support beyond exploration

The policy opportunity also extends into processing.

In July 2026, Teck, Canada Growth Fund and the Canada Critical Minerals Accelerator signed a strategic investment framework for Trail Operations in British Columbia. The initiative could double Trail’s existing antimony and germanium production capacity, and provides for government purchasing rights over part of future antimony, germanium and gallium production.

This is an important distinction: Canada’s lack of antimony mine output does not mean it lacks antimony processing capability.

The broader Canada Critical Minerals Accelerator prioritises projects serving defence and allied supply chains, using tools including equity, loan guarantees and supply agreements. Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy also identifies secure supplies of essential inputs as part of strengthening the defence industrial base.

Why Western buyers need more supply

China produced an estimated 40,000 tonnes of antimony in 2025, against 110,000 tonnes worldwide, roughly 36% of global mine output.

Russia produced 32,000 tonnes and Tajikistan 22,000 tonnes. So, together with China, they accounted for roughly 85% of the reported global total, illustrating how concentrated the mine-supply base remains.

China’s influence also runs through trade policy. Its antimony export-licensing controls took effect on September 15, 2024. Beijing subsequently restricted shipments to the US before suspending the US-specific mineral prohibition under a separate November 2025 notice.

As we wrote in China lifts export ban gallium, germanium, antimony:

“investors and policymakers should view the move as a reprieve, not a resolution”

The US Geological Survey estimates US net import reliance at 91% of apparent antimony consumption in 2025, with China supplying 55% of US metal and oxide imports during 2021–2024, showing why buyers have an incentive to develop alternative suppliers.

And prices demonstrate the effect of disruption, with the annual average antimony metal price rose from US$10.24 a pound in 2024 to US$25 in 2025, using the survey’s minimum 99.65%-purity benchmark.

The opportunity extends beyond digging ore. As we explained in Why antimony’s supply crisis is far from over:

“And the problem is not only a shortage of mines, but also a shortage of processing capacity.”

For Canada, developing deposits alongside a viable processing route would give Western buyers a more complete alternative supply chain. It would also create opportunities for technical services, refining investment and long-term purchasing agreements.

Why Washington cares: antimony and US defence

Separate US antimony awards, conditional loan approval and stockpile contract ceiling. Amounts are not additive.

The defence market needs particular antimony products, not just ore.

For example, in May 2025, Perpetua disclosed US$59.2 million in Defense Production Act support and up to US$22.4 million under an Army ordnance programme. The latter supports testing and a modular pilot plant to produce military-specification antimony trisulfide from Stibnite material.

That is a strategy spanning the full supply chain: help develop the mine, establish suitable processing and qualify the product for ammunition manufacturers.

Construction finance is another part of the pipeline so, in May 2026, the Export-Import Bank approved a US$2.9 billion loan for Stibnite, including an upfront facility of US$2.4 billion and the balance for capitalised interest and fees.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon announced US$27 million for US Antimony Corporation to expand Montana refining and support extraction in Alaska. The company also holds a five-year National Defense Stockpile supply contract worth up to US$245 million, with shipments described in its September update.

Development grants support technical work, loans support construction and stockpile contracts create a customer for qualified output.

The Iran war has added urgency to the debate over defence-metal supply. Reporting on Canada’s antimony gap highlighted uses in explosive formulations, flares and infrared sensors, alongside industry calls for more targeted Canadian support.

“The country has only a handful of meaningful projects, most tied to gold systems rather than stand-alone antimony mines and still lacks a clear domestic route from mine to metal”

— Northern Miner, Canada’s antimony gap shows as Iran war sharpens focus on defence metals

The pipeline is real, with the Pentagon’s Defense Production Act programme works with US and Canadian companies, and the two governments have already co-invested in Yukon critical-minerals development.

And trade policy is moving in the same direction: the January Section 232 proclamation directed negotiations over secure supplies of processed critical minerals and identified price floors as a possible tool, establishing a policy route towards supporting reliable supply agreements.

Canada’s budget eligibility

The tax changes are budget proposals, and eligibility depends on the final rules and investors’ circumstances, with the antimony expansion covering eligible agreements entered into after Budget Day and through March 31, 2032 — it does not automatically qualify every antimony company or finance mine construction.

However, the potential national security pipeline demand and government support to accelerate is now taking shape across North America — connecting those capabilities to allied purchasing programmes would turn a geological opportunity into a stronger position in Western defence manufacturing.

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US warns China over rare earths after Beijing delivers only two-thirds of commitments

  • the US warned China on Friday it must immediately meet its Busan trade commitments, after US officials said Beijing was fulfilling only about two-thirds of its rare-earth pledge
  • Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and USTR Jamieson Greer spoke with Vice Premier He Lifeng on November 6, with Bessent pressing China to fully and immediately implement its Busan commitments and Greer naming rare earths, other critical minerals and farm purchases
  • China’s published suspension of its October 2025 rare-earth export controls still ends on November 10, 2026 under MOFCOM Announcement No. 70, even as the US says the wider truce now runs to January 10, 2027

 

The US warned China on Friday it must “immediately” meet its commitments under the Busan trade deal, after US officials told the Financial Times in September that Beijing was fulfilling only about two-thirds of its rare-earth pledge.

One person familiar with the talks said China had not raised rare-earth supply since Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent raised the issue directly with Vice Premier He Lifeng in New York in September, ahead of Xi Jinping’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington.

On Friday morning, November 6, Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer spoke with He Lifeng about the bilateral economic relationship and implementation of the Busan arrangement, the deal Trump and Xi struck in Busan, South Korea, in October 2025. Bessent emphasised “the importance of China fully and immediately implementing its commitments made in Busan” and raised concerns about recent Chinese actions. Greer emphasised “concrete actions” to fully implement past commitments, “particularly as they relate to agricultural purchases, rare earths, and other critical minerals.” The official readouts do not quantify the shortfall. China has rejected US claims that it is not fulfilling its rare-earth commitments, according to the FT.

One US official told the FT that Bessent and Greer made clear Trump viewed the situation as a “priority” and that China had to live up to its Busan pledges.

On X, Bessent put the same demand in his own words:

“I emphasized the importance of China fully and immediately honoring its commitments, raised concerns about recent Chinese actions and underscored that progress depends on concrete results.”

Greer named the commodities again:

“I underscored the critical importance of China taking concrete actions to fully implement its past commitments, particularly as they relate to agricultural purchases, rare earths, and other critical minerals.”

Separately, at MOFCOM’s November 5 regular press conference, spokesperson Huang Ling said China remains open to buying more US farm goods, but only if both sides implement their “US$30 billion for US$30 billion” reciprocal tariff-cut arrangement. The FT reports that Washington has concluded China is meeting its soybean pledges but falling short on other farm produce.

What the deal promised on rare earths

Under the White House Busan fact sheet, China agreed to suspend the expansive rare-earth export controls announced on October 9, 2025, and to issue general licences for rare earths, gallium, germanium, antimony and graphite for US end users and their suppliers worldwide.

That suspension is time-limited on China’s books. MOFCOM and Customs Announcement No. 70 of 2025 pauses the October 2025 package only until November 10, 2026. The April 2025 licensing regime on seven medium and heavy rare earths, including yttrium, dysprosium and terbium, was never suspended and still needs a MOFCOM licence for each shipment. When Xi visited Washington in September, the sides extended the original truce deadline by two months to January 10, 2027 after negotiators failed to resolve differences, according to the FT. China’s published Announcement No. 70 has not yet been amended to match that date.

The market picture

China’s overall rare-earth exports are not collapsing. Customs data via SMM show September shipments of 4,269.8 metric tonnes, up 6.7% from a year earlier but down 9.8% from August. January-September exports were 43,711 tonnes, down 9.6% year on year.

Bar chart of China monthly rare-earth exports April to September 2026

The squeeze shows up more clearly in heavy rare earths and prices outside China. As of November 5, SMM quoted European dysprosium oxide at US$3,300-4,200 a kilogram, against US$215-220 a kilogram inside China. European terbium oxide was US$7,300-8,300 a kilogram. SMM said inventories in Europe were tight and that dysprosium, terbium and gadolinium often had prices but no goods.

Bar chart comparing dysprosium and terbium oxide prices in Europe versus China on 5 November 2026

Washington is also concerned about Chinese restrictions on yttrium exports to Japan, which makes components for US-manufactured products. Japanese companies have warned their government that stockpiles are running dangerously low, the FT reports. That matches the picture we laid out in October: China’s yttrium oxide exports to Japan fell 97.7% in January-May 2026. China still accounted for 60% of mined magnet rare earths, 91% of refined output and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production in 2024, according to the IEA.

Who is building outside China

While Washington presses Beijing on licences, it is also building supply at home. On November 5 the Defense Logistics Agency said it had committed US$2 billion in fiscal year 2026 to acquire strategic and critical materials for the National Defense Stockpile. MP Materials still runs Mountain Pass, the only producing US rare-earth mine. Energy Fuels is building heavy rare-earth capacity at White Mesa in Utah. USA Rare Earth is developing a mine-to-magnet chain in Texas.

The calendar

The call lands four days before MOFCOM’s published November 10, 2026 end date for the October 2025 control suspension. Trump and Xi are expected at APEC in Shenzhen on November 18-19, about two weeks away. Trade is not expected to be a large part of that meeting, but it will likely be discussed in more detail at the G20 in Miami in December, according to the FT. Bessent and Greer are expected to meet their Chinese counterparts in person between APEC and the G20.

Conclusion

A Trump-Xi deal in Miami could redefine what full implementation means and push the argument into 2027, and in the meantime US stockpile buying and Mountain Pass / White Mesa output could ease the tightest defence grades faster than expected.

But, Bessent’s test is now public. Busan is only working if rare earths, other critical minerals and farm purchases show up as concrete results before the next Trump-Xi meeting.

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MPs warn Britain fails critical minerals tests over China dependence

 

MPs say they cannot be confident that the UK government passes any of ten tests for cutting dangerous dependence on China for critical minerals, in a House of Commons report — which also shows cumulative rare-earth demand for Industrial Strategy growth sectors rising from 1,161 tonnes in 2024 to 18,020 tonnes by 2030.

The Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee published its Critical minerals report (HC 132) on 5 November 2026.

The report warns Britain cannot re-arm, deliver net zero or build artificial intelligence infrastructure without securing the minerals those technologies need. Permanent magnets made from rare earths sit in wind turbines, electric-vehicle motors, data centres and defence platforms.

Demand is rising while refining stays concentrated

The committee uses the government’s own estimates of how much of each mineral Britain’s priority industries, such as clean energy, defence and advanced manufacturing, will need.

On those figures, the UK’s cumulative demand from 2024 to 2030 compares with 2024 alone as follows:

  • rare earths: 18,020 tonnes, up from 1,161 tonnes (x15)
  • lithium: 113,400 tonnes, up from 2,525 tonnes (x45)
  • graphite: 137,800 tonnes, up from 9,070 tonnes (x15)
  • cobalt: 76,610 tonnes, up from 6,089 tonnes (x13)
  • nickel: 416,100 tonnes, up from 50,430 tonnes (x8)

Grouped bar chart of UK cumulative Industrial Strategy growth-sector demand for rare earths, lithium, graphite, cobalt and nickel in 2024 versus midpoint estimates to 2030, on a log scale

The bottleneck is not only mining.

Dr Gavin Mudd, director of the UK Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre, told the inquiry that “the processing stage … is where the bottlenecks are” — the International Energy Agency estimates China is the leading refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals, with an average market share of about 70% — for magnet rare earths alone, China’s share of refining was about 91% in 2024.

Bar chart of China share of global refined production in 2024 for copper, lithium chemicals, nickel by location, cobalt, battery-grade graphite and magnet rare earths

China’s dominance matters for countries like the UK and US because China has already used export restrictions as a matter of geopolitical leverage: in April 2025 it imposed export controls on a group of rare earths after US tariffs, with shortages quickly spreading through car makers in the US and Europe. A later US-China deal suspended parts of the regime, but a licensing system remains, and James Kynge of Chatham House told MPs China still has a “chokehold” over rare-earth supply worldwide.

Rearmament makes both government concern and the volumes involved a matter of national security. for example, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence estimates an F-35 fighter jet uses about 418 kilograms of rare earths, an Arleigh Burke destroyer about 2,600 kilograms, and a Virginia-class submarine about 4,600 kilograms, figures the committee cites in its report.

Horizontal bar chart showing rare earths used per defence platform: F-35 fighter jet 418 kg, Arleigh Burke destroyer 2,600 kg, Virginia-class submarine 4,600 kg

We have covered the same midstream problem from the US and G7 side. The G7 has aimed to cut reliance on any single outside supplier of rare earths and permanent magnets to under 60% by 2030. The Pentagon is pouring capital into non-Chinese magnets and refining, including its stake in MP Materials. The UK report is the British version of that recognition: processing and magnets, not just mines, decide who is exposed.

Ten tests, and a failing grade

To hold ministers to account, the committee set ten tests. They cover what capabilities the UK wants to protect, how much mineral demand that implies, what allies need, where the chokepoints are, what can be mined or recycled at home, whether energy and planning rules support projects, whether skills are in place, whether allied offtake deals exist, whether the full financing stack is available, and whether companies are actually diversifying.

“Today, we cannot be confident that the Government passes any single one of these ten tests,” the report says.

Chair Liam Byrne put it more bluntly: “Critical minerals are the alpha of the new economy.” He said Britain remains “dangerously exposed” sixteen years after China first cut rare-earth exports to Japan in 2010.

The UK is almost completely import-dependent for critical minerals and has no domestic rare-earth mining or refining capacity, the report notes. About 80% of UK metal waste is exported rather than recycled at home. The National Wealth Fund’s US$33.5 million (£25 million, at US$1.34 to the pound on 6 November 2026) minimum equity ticket leaves many early-stage projects needing US$6.7 million to US$27 million (£5 million to £20 million) stranded.

Where the money and the opportunity sit

The committee’s answer is institutional muscle.

It recommends a Critical Minerals Finance Facility that can pull together UK Research and Innovation, British International Investment, UK Export Finance and the National Wealth Fund, then deploy grants, equity, debt, guarantees, offtakes and price floors. It also wants allied “buyers’ clubs” to share the cost of new mines and smelters, which can reach about US$3 billion apiece.

Some capital is already moving.

In August 2026 the National Wealth Fund announced up to US$95 million (£71 million) for Tungsten West to restart the Hemerdon tungsten mine in Devon, with an exclusive negotiation window over up to 50% of annual output, and in October the UK’s state-owned National Wealth Fund (NWF) is put US$55.7m (£41.7m) into Cornish Metals to support tin mining.

Vision 2035 targets 10% of UK critical-mineral demand from domestic production and 20% from recycling by 2035, with no more than 60% of aggregate demand from any one country.

The UK already has pieces of a non-Chinese magnet chain: Ionic Technologies is developing magnet recycling and refining in Belfast; Less Common Metals in Cheshire makes rare-earth metals and alloys and was acquired by USA Rare Earth; HyProMag, backed by Mkango, is building magnet recycling and manufacturing in Birmingham. Those plants are not named in the committee report, but they sit where MPs say Britain should put money: processing, recycling and magnets. That is also where UK policy still lags the US, which has used equity, loans, offtakes and price floors while London still leans on strategy papers and export-credit rules with a 20% UK-export test.

Complete decoupling from China is neither realistic nor desirable, the committee itself says, and Chinese refined rare-earth components remain five to six times cheaper than Western equivalents, but it appears the government has take notice.

Conclusion

We warned in 2024 that the UK’s critical mineral and energy supply, between revolution and disaster — it appears the government is now agreed and warning of the need to avert disaster.

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Nickel jumps 3.8% as Indonesia targets major ore trader

  • Indonesia’s Forest Area Order and Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH) is taking enforcement action against companies linked to former Glencore trader Arif Kurniawan over alleged illegal forest use and mining-permit irregularities
  • LME three-month nickel rose 3.8% to US$16,375 a tonne at 17:00 GMT on November 5, with a session high of US$16,415, its strongest since September 25
  • a 2025 Bloomberg investigation estimated his network handled about one-third of Indonesia’s domestic nickel ore trade and held interests in at least 20 concessions covering more than 71,000 hectares

 

Three-month nickel on the London Metal Exchange rose 3.8% to US$16,375 a tonne at 17:00 GMT on November 5 after Indonesia’s forest task force moved against companies linked to nickel trader Arif Kurniawan.

The metal hit a session high of US$16,415, its strongest since September 25. Westmetall’s LME three-month official settlement for the day was US$16,265, up from US$15,675 on November 4.

Indonesia’s Forest Area Order and Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH) has begun taking control of forest land allegedly used unlawfully by companies linked to Kurniawan, a former Glencore trader – as part of a wider crackdown on mining companies in Indonesia.

Indonesia accounted for about 62% of world nickel mine production in 2024 and an estimated 67% in 2025 — so, any disruption to a trader reported to have moved roughly a third of the country’s ore therefore matters far beyond Indonesia’s forests.

Line chart of LME nickel 3-month official settlement from August to November 2026, showing a jump to US$16,265 a tonne on 5 November after Indonesia targeted companies linked to ore trader Arif Kurniawan

Task force spokesperson Barita Simanjuntak confirmed that the figure first identified only as “AK” is Kurniawan. Authorities say an initial review found irregularities in mining governance, licensing and forest use. Under Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2025, the task force can reclaim land, impose administrative fines, recover assets and refer evidence for prosecution.

A 2025 Bloomberg investigation estimated that Kurniawan and his main business partner held interests in at least 20 mining concessions spanning more than 71,000 hectares, and that his businesses handled about one-third of Indonesia’s domestic nickel ore trade, although the task force has not confirmed those figures.

The Kurniawan case sits inside a wider Satgas PKH campaign:

Forest rules are one lever among several under President Prabowo. For example, Jakarta revoked four nickel licences in Raja Ampat in June 2025, raised progressive mining royalties under Government Regulation No. 19 of 2025, and moved mining production quotas to a one-year approval cycle.

For investors outside Indonesia, the pattern matters more than any single hectare count as environmental and forestry enforcement can interrupt ore supply and leave more pricing power with producers elsewhere.

Indonesian producers were already facing tighter mining quotas and rising costs in 2026, with Macquarie now expects nickel and nickel-product exports to fall about 6% this year, more than it forecast at the start of the year, and says attention is shifting to the 2027 ore quotas.

Bar chart of Indonesia share of world nickel mine production rising from 25% in 2018 to an estimated 67% in 2025, based on USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries

That fits the theme we set out in Indonesia’s nickel dilemma is the West’s opportunity, with Indonesia’s scale has come with environmental and governance risk, and that opens the door for producers elsewhere. Going after a trader credited with a third of ore flows is a bigger test of whether enforcement becomes a lasting supply shock. It also lands on top of Jakarta’s tighter 2026 ore quota, which has already left smelters leaning on Philippine ore.

However, the task force has not named the companies or concessions, said how many hectares are involved or announced any criminal findings, and Glencore has not been linked to the latest action. So, if the land comes back into legal production quickly, the supply risk fades.

But, for now, the move fits a pattern in the world’s largest nickel producer — the government is moving in with greater regulation. And the nickel price is responding.

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REalloys signs term sheet for up to 75-year US Army lease for Utah heavy rare-earths plant

  • REalloys signed a non-binding term sheet with the US Army for a dysprosium and terbium processing plant on about 200 acres of Tooele Army Depot, Utah
  • the proposed lease runs 50 years with one 25-year renewal, and the Army would get the first chance to buy output but no obligation to buy it
  • China holds what the Army calls a “near 100% global monopoly” on dysprosium and terbium, the heavy rare earths that keep magnets in missiles, radar and electric motors working at high temperatures

 

REalloys has taken a step towards building a heavy rare-earths processing plant on US Army land in Utah after signing a non-binding term sheet with the Army for a lease of up to 75 years at Tooele Army Depot.

The announcement comes less than two months before the Pentagon stops buying weapons that contain Chinese rare-earth magnets on January 1, 2027, as we reported in Pentagon’s China rare earth ban starts on Jan 1, but new supply can take 10 years.

The term sheet is not a signed lease, and instead sets out the main terms both sides would negotiate into a final Enhanced Use Lease, a deal that lets the Army rent spare land to private companies — and part of the US Army strategy to turn bases into critical mineral safe havens.

What REalloys and the Army have agreed

The plant would sit on about 200 acres and process and refine dysprosium and terbium, with other rare earths possible later if both sides agree in writing.

Those two metals are added to neodymium magnets so they keep their strength at high temperatures, in precision-guided munitions, electric motors, sonar and radar.

Under the proposed terms, REalloys would:

  • develop, finance, build, operate and eventually decommission the plant, while the US keeps title to the land
  • hold an initial 50-year lease with one 25-year renewal option, subject to Army consent
  • pay annual base rent at fair market value from the start of the lease, plus a share of revenue (“participation rent”) once commercial operations begin

 

The Army would get a right of first offer on the plant’s output, but it is not obliged to buy anything.

The release gives no capacity, cost or start date for the Utah plant.

Tooele itself is a 43,000-acre ammunition depot set up in 1942, which the Army said in April had land to spare for private partners. Its model is Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, where Hanwha Defense is making a US$1.3 billion private investment in an explosives plant on Army land.

Jeff Waksman, the Army’s principal deputy assistant secretary for installations, energy and environment, set out why the Army wants the deal:

“Rare earth processing is a known national security vulnerability, with China specifically holding a near 100% global monopoly on dysprosium and terbium.”

Jeff Waksman, US Army

Why heavy rare earths matter

Bar chart of China's share of global magnet rare earths in 2024, according to the IEA: 60% of mining, 91% of refining and 94% of magnet production

China produced 91% of the world’s refined rare earths and about 94% of the magnets that use dysprosium and terbium in 2024, according to the IEA.

Beijing has required licences to export seven medium and heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium, since April 4, 2025. That rule was never part of the US–China trade truce, unlike a wider October 2025 package of controls whose suspension runs until November 10. Beijing said in September that the wider truce would be extended to January 10, 2027, but as of early November it had published no legal notice extending the suspension.

The result is an increasingly two-price market: in Europe, dysprosium and terbium cost around five times more than in China, according to the IEA.

That is the opportunity for a processor outside China, and Washington is already paying to build them.

Other US government rare-earth deals

The Pentagon and the Commerce Department have backed numerous rare-earth companies since mid-2025, including:

 

Together, these deals add up to about US$3 billion of public support, by our calculation, but most of it is loans: about US$2.15 billion, including up to US$1.3 billion for USA Rare Earth that is paid out only as the company hits milestones.

Bar chart of selected US government rare-earth deals since 2025 in US$ million, totalling about US$3 billion by our calculation: USA Rare Earth 1,577 (277 funding plus up to 1,300 loans), Vulcan Elements 670 conditional or non-binding, MP Materials 550 (400 equity, 150 loan), Lynas 96 offtake, ReElement 80 conditional loan, Ucore 22.4 grant, REalloys Tooele land lease only with no money

(About US$750 million, for Vulcan and ReElement, is still conditional or non-binding, and Lynas’s US$96 million buys rare-earth products rather than investing in the company.)

The Army deal is different: it offers land, not money. In Waksman’s words, it is designed to work “without putting any taxpayer dollars at risk.”

It is also part of a wider Army programme, when in June the Army conditionally selected four companies to process graphite, lithium, boron and heavy rare earths on four bases, and REalloys is the only rare-earths project among them.

It is the second to sign a term sheet, after Titan Mining agreed terms for a graphite plant at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama in October.

Where Utah fits in REalloys’ plans

Nasdaq-listed REalloys (ALOY) is building what it calls a “mine-to-magnet” chain, and Utah would add to projects already under way, for example:

 

REalloys ended June with US$122.4 million in cash after a US$100 million share placement, and says it has committed about US$58.3 million to fund the Saskatoon upgrade and the metal plant through commissioning.

In other words, Utah would give REalloys a US site under Army protection for the next step: refining heavy rare earths at home rather than in Canada.

What could prove this wrong

The term sheet can still fall away. Before a final lease is signed, the two sides must agree the rent, the Army must accept REalloys’ development plan, and the project must pass:

  • environmental reviews and permitting
  • a review of foreign ownership, control or influence
  • project financing and REalloys board approval
  • Army determinations and notification to Congress

 

If those conditions are not met or waived within 18 months, either side can walk away.

The “75-year deal” is the maximum: 50 years plus a 25-year renewal that needs Army consent, under a lease that does not yet exist.

There is also no guaranteed buyer, as a right of first offer means the Army sees the product first, not that it must purchase it, and the release puts no figure on the plant’s cost or how REalloys would pay for it.

Supply is the other question. There is no mine on the base, so the plant would depend on feedstock from elsewhere, and Chief Executive Leonard Sternheim told Fox Business a Western supply chain is more likely by 2029 or 2030 than overnight. As we wrote in our earlier article:

“New mines and refineries are coming, but on the industry’s timeline of years, not the Pentagon’s deadline of weeks.”

The Oregon Group

If the Tooele deal becomes a lease, the Army will have done something money alone has not: put heavy rare-earth refining inside a US military fence, reinforcing the national security support for secure rare earth supply.

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Chile copper output falls 15%, steepest drop since 2017, as Kamoa-Kakula cuts Congo guidance

 

Chile’s copper output fell 15.1% in September from a year earlier to 387,870 metric tonnes, its steepest monthly drop since the Escondida strike in March 2017, putting the world’s top producer on course for its lowest annual output since 2003.

It was also the lowest September in the national statistics institute’s series, which starts in 2018, and below every September in Cochilco data going back to 2003, where the previous low was 392,500 tonnes in 2006. August was worse still: at 366,301 tonnes, it was the lowest single month in Cochilco’s series since 2003.

The Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco) now forecasts 4.94 million tonnes for 2026, down 8.4%. That would be the first year below 5 million tonnes in 22 years, and nearly 900,000 tonnes below the record 5.83 million tonnes Chile mined in 2018.

Output for January-September was down 8.6% at 3.66 million tonnes. The national statistics institute blamed a temporary suspension at a large mine and lower ore grades at several others.

Meanwhile, in Congo, Ivanhoe Mines has cut 2027 copper guidance at Kamoa-Kakula to 300,000-350,000 tonnes, from 380,000-420,000 tonnes. It is the second cut this year at one of the world’s biggest new copper mines.

Together, the two announcements put a question mark over the copper forecasts that expect supply to recover next year.

Bar chart of Chile copper mine production from 2003 to 2026, showing a 2018 peak of 5.83 million tonnes and a 2026 Cochilco forecast of 4.94 million tonnes, the lowest since 2003

Why Chile’s copper output fell

Cochilco says Escondida, Codelco and Spence account for 77.3% of the net fall in Chile’s output in January-September. Escondida produced 127,000 tonnes less, down 12.5%; Codelco 84,000 tonnes less, down 9.0%; and Spence 51,000 tonnes less, down 25.7%.

In the September quarter alone, Escondida, the world’s biggest copper mine, produced 252,600 tonnes, down 23%, as BHP reported a planned fall in ore grade to 0.81% copper from 0.94%, severe winter weather and a suspension of mining after a fatal accident.

At state-owned Codelco, the biggest falls were at Ministro Hales, down 32.4%, and El Teniente, down 17.1%, a division still restricted after its fatal accident in 2025.

Notably, much of this is not a one-off accident. Lower grades mean miners have to move and process more rock for the same amount of copper, and that problem does not reverse quickly.

Cochilco expects Chile to recover only to 5.08 million tonnes in 2027, still 5.7% below 2025. As recently as August, it expected 5.27 million tonnes this year and 5.55 million tonnes in 2027. In other words, in about two months, Chile’s own copper agency cut its 2027 forecast for the country by roughly 470,000 tonnes.

Bar chart comparing previous and latest copper production forecasts: Chile 2026 cut from 5,270 to 4,935 thousand tonnes, Chile 2027 from 5,550 to 5,084, and Kamoa-Kakula 2027 guidance midpoint from 400 to 325

Kamoa-Kakula’s path back to 500,000 tonnes gets longer

Kamoa-Kakula is expected to produce about 290,000 tonnes of copper in 2026, after the seismic events and flooding at the Kakula mine in 2025.

Ivanhoe said the slower 2027 ramp-up was mainly due to a delay in mining the eastern side of Kakula until late in the first quarter of 2028, and a lower maximum mining rate there. It also raised 2027 cash-cost guidance to US$2.50-3.00 a pound, from US$2.10-2.50, citing diesel prices, lower grades and lower output.

The operation itself is improving, with Kamoa-Kakula produced 76,401 tonnes in the third quarter, up from 64,328 tonnes in the second.

But Ivanhoe now expects its three existing processing plants to reach only 400,000-450,000 tonnes a year, and the route back to about 500,000 tonnes depends on a Phase 4 expansion that has not yet been approved and would take 18-24 months to build once it is.

Craig Hutchison, an analyst at TD Cowen, put it plainly:

“The path back to about 500,000 tonnes per year has become longer, more capital intensive and more dependent on future execution,” he wrote in a note, downgrading Ivanhoe to hold from buy.

Do copper forecasts allow for falls like this?

They do, but the allowances keep proving too small.

The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) cuts its mine supply forecasts by an allowance for supply disruptions based on its average forecast errors over the previous five years. For 2027, that takes its world mine output forecast from 25.18 million tonnes to 24.22 million tonnes, a cut of about 960,000 tonnes.

Banks do the same: Macquarie’s 2026 copper balance includes a 531,000-tonne disruption allowance.

The problem is that recent disruptions have run past those buffers. For example, after Grasberg’s mudslide in September 2025, Goldman Sachs said the 525,000-tonne production loss exceeded its typical allowances for global supply disruptions and cut its mine supply growth forecasts.

Sprott estimates the Grasberg and Kamoa-Kakula disruptions alone removed about 600,000 tonnes of expected 2026 production, around 2.5% of global mine supply, before Chile’s latest falls.

Even the ICSG has had to keep cutting, so in October it lowered its 2026 world mine growth forecast to 1.3% from the 1.6% it expected in April, mainly on Chile, China and Indonesia.

Its 2027 outlook still relies on better output in Chile and Zambia and a recovery in Indonesia and Congo, and both Cochilco’s Chile cut and Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula cut came after that forecast was published.

Why the downgrades matter

The ICSG still expects a refined copper surplus of 368,000 tonnes in 2027, and Cochilco forecasts a surplus of 215,000 tonnes, about 0.8% of global consumption.

Those surpluses are thin. Cochilco’s own report says that if 2027 demand came in just 1% higher than expected, with supply unchanged, the surplus would turn into a deficit of about 65,000 tonnes.

Cochilco also expects Chile and Congo to add 148,000 and 145,000 tonnes respectively of the 786,000-tonne rise in world mine output it forecasts for 2027. By our calculation, that is about 37% of the total, from exactly the two countries where expectations have just been cut.

The market is already tight. LME copper traded at US$14,103 a tonne on November 4, and Cochilco forecasts an average of US$6.18 a pound in 2026 and US$5.95 in 2027.

New supply is coming, but slowly. Freeport-McMoRan has approved a US$4.5 billion expansion of its Bagdad mine in Arizona, adding about 225 million pounds (roughly 102,000 tonnes, by our conversion) a year, but first production is not expected until mid-2030.

For investors, the wider point is that miners with reliable production, and projects in stable jurisdictions that can actually be built, become more valuable each time a big operation falls short. As we have noted, the world will need US$360 billion of new copper mines by 2050.

What could prove this wrong

Chile’s fall is partly temporary. Escondida’s suspension has ended, the winter weather has passed, and Cochilco expects Chile’s output to rise 3% in 2027.

Kamoa-Kakula’s recoveries and mining rates are improving, and open-pit ore from the third quarter of 2027 could lift output faster than guided.

And, not every analyst agrees the buffers are too small. Panmure Liberum has said reported copper mine disruptions for 2025-26 amount to only 30%-50% of published disruption allowances.

Demand could also disappoint, with the ICSG cut its 2026 refined copper usage forecast, and high prices, US tariff policy and slower economic growth could all reduce consumption — but as we highlighted in our recent analysis, the same report flags how copper mines are struggling to keep up.

Even so, two years running, big copper mines have fallen well short of plan, and the supply recovery (depending on America’s copper tariffs) for 2027 now rests on the same countries that have just disappointed.

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