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US suppliers not ready for Pentagon’s 2027 ban on China-sourced magnets and minerals
Major US mineral suppliers say they will not be ready for a January 1, 2027 Pentagon deadline requiring defense contractors to stop purchasing covered rare-earth magnets, tungsten, tantalum and molybdenum sourced from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
US demand for neodymium-iron-boron, or NdFeB, magnets reached roughly 48,000 tonnes in 2025, according to Arthur D. Little data, reported by Reuters — but domestic sources supplied just 300 tonnes.
“It’s going to take many more years to get the needed infrastructure in the ground to compete” — Chris Berry, a minerals industry analyst and consultant, told Reuters.
And, even if US magnet production capacity reaches the projected 5,000 tonnes by the end of this year, it would still represent little more than 10% of total national demand.
To be clear, that comparison overstates the Pentagon’s direct requirement: 48,000 tonnes covers the entire US market, not defense procurement alone, but the numbers reveal the scale of the industrial gap.
This is not simply a ban on Chinese magnets
The Pentagon’s 2027 rule reaches much further upstream than just Chinese magnets, with the updated Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement extending restrictions across critical supply chains:
- mining the constituent minerals
- refining and separation
- metal and alloy production
- powder formation and pressing
- sintering or bonding
- magnetisation
- production of the finished magnet
The governing law, 10 USC 4872, covers samarium-cobalt and NdFeB magnets, tungsten metal powder, tungsten heavy alloy and components, tantalum metals and alloys, and molybdenum. It applies to Pentagon prime contracts and subcontracts at every tier.
In other words, assembling a magnet in Texas does not make it compliant if its oxide, alloy or another restricted input came from China.
And China still produces 60% of mined magnet rare earths, 91% of refined output and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production.
This is why the deadline is so difficult: the bottleneck is not the ore body, but the supply and processing chain between the mine and the finished magnet.
China tightens its own rare earth restrictions
China’s rare earth export restrictions are also adding pressure to the Pentagon deadline.
China has added MP Materials and USA Rare Earth to its export control list, restricting Chinese companies from supplying the two US rare earth firms with certain dual-use goods and technologies, putting two of America’s most important rare earth producers directly in Beijing’s sights.
Announced capacity is arriving too late
America’s project pipeline is growing rapidly has the potential to establish the first serious non-Chinese rare-earth industrial ecosystem in decades, but unfortunately much of it is scheduled to arrive after the deadline:
| Supplier or project | Near-term position | Larger-scale capacity |
|---|---|---|
| MP Materials | Its Independence facility is commissioning and ramping towards a projected 3,000 tonnes per year of magnets. | The additional 7,000-tonne 10X facility is only expected to begin commissioning in 2028. |
| USA Rare Earth | Stillwater Phase 1A is targeting a 600-tonne annual run rate by the end of Q4 2026; Phase 1B is expected to bring total capacity to 1,200 tonnes in Q1 2027. | Its 6,400-tonne South Carolina facility is targeted to begin commissioning in 2028. |
| Ucore | Its initial Louisiana machine will separate about 600 tonnes per year of rare-earth oxides—not produce magnets—and is scheduled for installation, testing and commissioning in H1 2027. | The proposed complex is designed for approximately 9,600 tonnes of oxide throughput. |
| VAC, Sumter | The recently commissioned South Carolina facility has 2,000 tonnes of magnet nameplate capacity. | Planned upstream integration relies on projects and processing expansions stretching into 2027–2029. |
| Evolution Metals & Technologies | The counter-case: it says 13 new machines could lift allied production capacity to approximately 10,000 tonnes by November 2026. | The equipment was still awaiting delivery, installation and commissioning when the target was announced. |
USA Rare Earth commissioned Phase 1A of its Stillwater facility in March, but reported no revenue from neo-magnet manufacturing during the first quarter. The company expects the line to ramp towards 600 tonnes of annual capacity by the end of 2026.
MP Materials has commenced manufacturing magnets on industrial-scale equipment at Independence, but remains in the final stages of commissioning. Its filing says production will increase in phases as additional capabilities are commissioned and scaled towards a projected 3,000-tonne annual capacity.
Evolution Metals, meanwhile, says 13 ordered magnet-production machines represent more than one year of their manufacturer’s planned Western output. The equipment was scheduled for delivery and installation by November 2026, leaving only a short period for commissioning and production ramp-up before the Pentagon deadline.
Rare earths are only part of the problem
The same deadline covers tungsten and tantalum, where the US upstream position is arguably even weaker.
- according to the US Geological Survey’s 2026 tungsten summary, tungsten has not been mined commercially in the US since 2015. The country remains more than 50% import reliant, with China accounting for 26% of imports during 2021–2024
(See our recent analysis — Why tungsten prices are rising so fast: inside the supply crunch) - the USGS tantalum assessment is more stark: America has not mined tantalum since 1959 and was 100% net import reliant in 2025; China supplied 22% of total tantalum imports and 47% of imported tantalum metal and powder during 2021–2024
- Molybdenum is the exception. US mines produced an estimated 40,000 tonnes in 2025 and the country was a net exporter
Importantly, the new rule does not require every mineral to be mined domestically — Australian tantalum, South Korean metals or European magnets may comply — but the entire relevant chain must be documented.
The waiver has not disappeared
Trump’s Executive Order 14415, “Securing America’s Defense Supply Chains and Ensuring Domestic Acquisition of Critical Materials,” signed on July 20, 2026, tightens the waiver process ahead of the deadline.
From January 1, waivers generally require an approved mitigation plan documenting exhaustive attempts to find compliant material and a timetable for removing non-compliant supply. The order also directs the Pentagon to develop rules requiring contractors to trace critical supply chains back to raw-material origin and allows contractual remedies against companies that fail to qualify alternative suppliers or implement approved mitigation plans.
The executive order was presented as a hardening of the deadline (it stops routine waivers, threatens contractual remedies and requires contractors to map supply chains back to raw-material origin), but the it also preserves a route for non-compliant material where contractors submit an approved mitigation plan that:
- identifies the non-compliant source
- documents exhaustive efforts to find compliant supply
- shows how the material will be removed from the supply chain
- provides a firm transition timetable
We do not expect the January 2027 deadline to be repealed and waivers do exist, but we do not yet know how vigorously the Pentagon will apply them. Instead it is likely to become a forcing mechanism: contractors will map their supply chains, qualify allied material, place more long-term orders with Western producers and seek waivers where no alternative exists.
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Why Geopolitics Has Overtaken Supply And Demand In Commodity Markets
For decades, commodity investors focused on supply-and-demand fundamentals. However, the models that guided commodity investing for much of the past 30 years were built on assumptions that no longer hold: stable trade flows, predictable geopolitical relationships, reliable access to global supply chains and the belief that markets would efficiently allocate resources across borders with minimal government interference.
Consider what commodity markets have absorbed in just the past few years. China has tightened controls on exports of critical materials such as gallium, germanium, graphite and rare earths. Governments from Indonesia to Mexico have become increasingly assertive about controlling access to natural resources. Even relatively obscure inputs like sulphuric acid have become concerns as geopolitical tensions have disrupted supply chains and increased processing costs across the critical minerals sector. These developments are no longer isolated events. They are becoming a recurring feature of the commodity landscape.
For executives and investors who still think about commodities primarily through a supply-and-demand lens, the risk exposure you’re carrying may be larger than you realize.
The Map Has Changed
Geopolitical risk in commodity markets used to mean something relatively contained—a strike at a Chilean copper mine, a coup in a producer nation or a temporary export restriction that lasted a few months before markets adjusted.
What we’re seeing today is different. Countries increasingly view access to resources not simply as an economic issue, but as a strategic advantage. Control over critical minerals, processing capacity and manufacturing infrastructure is becoming intertwined with national security, industrial policy and geopolitical influence.
China’s position in many critical mineral supply chains is difficult to overstate. In rare earths alone, it dominates both processing and magnet manufacturing. Similar patterns exist across graphite, gallium, germanium and other materials that are essential to semiconductors, defense technologies and advanced manufacturing.
Having spent much of my career investing in mining and resource companies, I have noticed a subtle but important shift. Ten years ago, most conversations with investors centered on demand forecasts, project economics and commodity prices. Today, discussions increasingly focus on where materials are processed, which governments control supply chains and how quickly alternative sources can be developed if trade flows are disrupted. This is not simply a market disruption; it’s the emergence of a new geopolitical architecture around commodity flows, and many corporate and investment strategies have not fully adapted.
Over $750 billion needed for energy mineral supply to meet demand
More than US$750 billion needs to be invested in mining and refining between 2026-2040 to meet demand for key energy minerals, according to the latest report by the International Energy Agency.
Copper and nickel dominate the capital requirement, with copper needing approx US$310 billion and nickel US$280 billion, together accounting for almost 80% of the total.
The estimate covers new mines, brownfield expansions, refining capacity and sustaining capital, and reflects rising development costs as ore grades decline, particularly in mature copper-producing regions.
The challenge is that the investment requirement is increasing as industry spending slows with critical-mineral investment falling 9% in 2025, ending several years of growth. Spending by battery-material companies dropped more than 20%, while lithium producers cut investment by around 40%.
Copper, however, was the exception, with capital spending by copper-focused companies rising 8%, and merger and acquisition values increasing by 20% from 2024.
The IEA expects supply deficits for copper and lithium to persist through 2035 with only about 75% of projected copper requirements being met in 2035 in its base-case scenario, despite progress at projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.
Nickel faces a different financing problem, with large volumes of low-cost Indonesian supply pressuring competing producers, even as the IEA estimates the industry needs US$280 billion of investment through 2040. The challenge is that virtually all recent growth in refined nickel supply has come from Indonesia but, as we have highlighted in our recent analysis, environmental concerns and stalling ore grades have started to throttle growth in the country.
The project pipeline is also heavily weighted towards mining, with new refining and downstream capacity outside dominant producing countries continuing to lag proposed mine supply.
By 2035, planned rare-earth refining capacity in diversified regions is expected to equal only around two-thirds of mine output, while magnet production would cover just one-third. Planned cathode capacity outside the dominant supplier is similarly equivalent to only about one-third of projected lithium mining capacity.
Governments support is rising, with public-finance commitments for critical-mineral value chains reaching about USD 65 billion in 2025, more than x4 levels in 2023 — however, the IEA warns a wide gap remains between announced commitments and capital actually deployed.
The investment challenge is therefore not simply to build more mines. It is to finance complete supply chains, from extraction through refining and manufacturing, while low prices, concentrated production and rising project costs continue to constrain private capital.
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Copper is the new oil
We’re not ready for the rising needs and the infrastructure takes years to build, says Anthony Milewski for Fast Company
For most of the past decade, technology companies have had the luxury of treating raw materials as someone else’s problem.
If you were building software, cloud infrastructure, electric vehicles, or clean-energy technologies, the assumption was that the underlying materials would simply be available when needed. Supply chains weren’t perfect, but they were generally reliable. If demand increased, producers would respond. If prices rose, markets would adjust.
Among the commodities that will shape the next decade, copper deserves far more attention than it gets today. It lacks the excitement of artificial intelligence and rarely generates headlines outside the mining industry, yet it sits at the center of nearly every major technological and industrial trend underway.
The reality is straightforward: The world is preparing for a significant increase in copper consumption at the same time that bringing new supply online is becoming more difficult.
For business leaders, particularly those involved in AI infrastructure, electrification, advanced manufacturing, and energy, that should matter.
China’s rare-earth restrictions push Japan to mine the Pacific seabed
China shipped no gallium, dysprosium, terbium or yttrium to Japan in June, extending an eight-month halt in shipments of critical magnet materials — pushing Japan to search for alternative rare earth sources almost six kilometres beneath the Pacific Ocean.
Exports of dysprosium and terbium oxide to Japan have remained at zero since November, Chinese customs data show. The squeeze is targeted: China’s worldwide rare-earth magnet exports rose 19% month-on-month in June to 5,649 tonnes.
Japan’s potential answer lies in rare-earth-rich mud near Minamitorishima, a remote island about 1,900 kilometres southeast of Tokyo.
Recent analysis found medium and heavy rare earths, including yttrium, gadolinium and dysprosium, made up 54% of the rare-earth content in mud recovered during a government-backed trial earlier this year.
The drilling vessel Chikyu raised about 50 tonnes of mud, excluding seawater added during extraction, from three deposits over a three-day test. Japan described it as the first continuous recovery of seabed sediment from a depth of 5,569 metres.
The deep-sea mining project plans to extract mineral resources from the ocean floor, but, for now, remains an experimental operation, not a commercial mine. This is possible as the deposit sits inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone, it is outside the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority, which regulates mining beyond national waters.
Yttrium, terbium and dysprosium are rare earth elements used in heat-resistant magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and weapons, and in coatings that protect aircraft and power-generation turbines. Japan has the world’s largest rare-earth magnet industry outside China and, before the latest restrictions, China accounted for 80% of Japan’s rare earth imports.
Beijing introduced licensing controls on seven medium and heavy rare-earth families in April 2025. It tightened restrictions on Japan early this year after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments about Taiwan deepened a diplomatic dispute. China says the controls protect national security and support its non-proliferation obligations.
The impact is spreading beyond specialist materials companies. More than two-thirds of almost 200 Japanese corporate filings that mentioned rare earths in May and June said the controls were hurting business or could do so, according to a recent Reuters analysis.
Tokyo plans a month-long seabed trial in February 2027, covering extraction, dewatering, transport, separation and refining. It expects to complete an economic assessment by March 2028.
Commercial supply remains years away. Operating at extreme depth, transporting material from one of Japan’s most isolated territories and rebuilding domestic separation capacity will be expensive. The government’s closed-loop lifting system is designed to limit sediment plumes, but analysis of the wider environmental effects is continuing.
Japan is therefore pursuing several routes at once: stockpiling, recycling, financing overseas producers and working with the US and other Group of Seven countries on alternative supply. A Japanese-backed processing and recycling plant in France is expected to supply dysprosium and terbium equal to about 20% of future Japanese demand.
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China’s helium ban strengthens US grip on global supply
- China halted helium exports on July 10, with no fixed end date
- China had become a re-export hub for Russian helium, including cargoes reaching Europe
- the ban follows Russian export controls and disruption to Qatar, which supplied roughly one-third of global helium
- semiconductor, medical and aerospace buyers face higher prices and tighter allocations
China has imposed a ban on helium exports, adding another layer of state control to a market already strained by war, sanctions and highly concentrated production — with helium spot prices have roughly doubled since the Middle East conflict began.
The July 10 order from China’s Ministry of Commerce and customs authority gave no expiry date, with Beijing stating the controls will be adjusted as domestic and international supply conditions change.
China depended on imports for 84.4% of its helium supply in 2025, and is seeking to protect its domestic semiconductor, artificial intelligence and medical industries from a supply shock.
But the helium ban’s impact extends beyond China.
China is a conduit, not just a consumer
China may not be a major primary helium producer, but its importance comes from its increasing role as a trading and redistribution hub for Russian helium supply.
Russia secured more than half of China’s helium import market in 2025, with some of those lower-cost volumes subsequently re-exported across Asia and into Europe — especially important after the EU banned direct imports of Russian helium in 2024. That route is not closed.
Global helium bans and disruption
The China helium ban is the latest in a sequence of shocks to the industry:
- Qatar, responsible for close to one-third of global production, lost significant output after attacks and disruption at Ras Laffan. A partial restart has remained fragile and well below normal operating levels, especially as conflict reignites across the region
- Russia, the world’s third-largest producer, introduced controls in April requiring government approval for exports outside the Eurasian Economic Union, with the restrictions expected to run through the end of 2027
- in July 2026, China stopped exports entirely, for an unspecified period
The physical helium supply chain makes the shortage harder to solve, as it is lighter than air and very difficult to “trap” for transportation. Liquid helium must travel in scarce cryogenic containers and gradually evaporates during transport.
China’s ban does not remove anything close to Qatar’s share of primary production. Its significance is that it traps supply inside one of the world’s largest consuming markets while cutting off a redistribution channel for Russian helium.
Semiconductors and hospitals
Semiconductor manufacturers are among the most exposed to the series of bans: helium is used in wafer cooling, plasma etching, deposition, lithography support and leak detection, with few viable substitutes in the most demanding processes.
Industry executives were already reporting production and delivery impacts in March 2026.
A prolonged shortage would eventually feed into longer chip lead times, higher manufacturing costs and greater competition between semiconductor plants, MRI operators, aerospace groups, fibre-optic manufacturers and defence users.
Global helium demand is forecast to rise from 176 million cubic metres to 322 million cubic metres by 2035, driven principally by semiconductors, AI infrastructure and data centres.
The United States as the world’s largest helium producer
As we reported in our recent analysis, the global helium crisis puts the US in control of the semiconductor supply chain.
The produced about 81 million cubic metres of helium in 2025, more than 40% of estimated global output, and has the scale to redirect volumes toward premium markets.
China’s move to restrict helium exports is the clearest sign yet that this once obscure gas has become a strategic choke point. For Europe and import‑dependent Asian manufacturers, the era of abundant, freely traded helium is rapidly slipping out of reach.
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Over $750 billion needed for energy mineral supply to meet demand
Copper is the new oil
China’s rare-earth restrictions push Japan to mine the Pacific seabed
China’s helium ban strengthens US grip on global supply
China’s copper premium jumps fivefold as inventories collapse
China’s premium for imported copper has surged from around $20 per tonne in late January to $100 per tonne, its highest level since May 2025, according to Shanghai Metals Market.
At the same time, copper inventories monitored by the Shanghai Futures Exchange fell 20% in one week to 79,909 tonnes. Stocks are now at their lowest level since August 2025 and have dropped more than 80% from their mid-March peak.
In other words, the world’s largest copper consumer is paying its highest import premium in 14 months, with buyers paying substantially more to secure physical metal just as locally available inventories are collapsing.
The Yangshan premium measures the additional price paid to import copper into China. Unlike futures prices, it offers a direct indication of demand for deliverable metal. Its move into triple digits suggests that the physical market is significantly tighter than the headline copper price implies.
China is pulling in metal
China’s refined copper imports reached a nine-month high in June, according to Reuters.
The squeeze is partly the unintended result of Beijing’s crackdown on China’s “invoice economy.” Authorities have intensified scrutiny of circular trades in which related parties exchange metal and use the resulting tax invoices to obtain financing. Restrictions on those invoices have reduced liquidity in the scrap market, constraining supplies and forcing some consumers to substitute refined cathode.
The higher Yangshan premium does not necessarily indicate a broad acceleration in Chinese end-user demand; it may instead reflect a sudden shift from scrap to imported refined copper. But the immediate physical consequence is the same: stronger competition for cathode at a time when exchange inventories are already falling.
London stocks are heading east
The pressure is now visible outside China.
Total copper inventories in London Metal Exchange warehouses stood at 295,275 tonnes, down 24% since the end of May. Although, more than half that metal had already been earmarked for withdrawal.
Cancelled warrants reached 166,025 tonnes, leaving only around 129,000 tonnes of on-warrant copper immediately available to the market. That available stock fell by roughly 35% in a single week.
Traders report that some of the metal leaving LME warehouses is being shipped to China, where the higher import premium has made those movements increasingly attractive.
The result is a reinforcing cycle: low Chinese inventories lift import premiums, higher premiums attract metal from the LME system, and falling LME availability tightens the market further.
Copper is plentiful, but in the wrong place
The exception is the United States.
Inventories held in CME Group’s Comex warehouse system have reached a record 630,293 tonnes after eight consecutive quarterly increases. Metal has been pulled into the country as traders position for possible US import tariffs.
This has produced a sharply divided market. Inventories are accumulating in the US while falling in China and across the readily available portion of the LME system.
The issue is therefore not simply how much copper exists in exchange warehouses. It is whether that copper is available in the right form and location.
Until the US tariff position is resolved, a large volume of metal may remain effectively trapped in American warehouses while consumers elsewhere compete for a diminishing pool of supply.
Chile offers little relief
The tightening is occurring as production from Chile, the world’s largest copper-producing country, continues to disappoint:
- in its production report published on July 15, Antofagasta said copper output fell 9.5% year on year to 285,000 tonnes during the first half of 2026
- in its June-quarter report published on July 20, South32 said its attributable payable copper production from Sierra Gorda fell 10% year on year to 16,000 tonnes during the three months ended June 30, as earlier weather-related disruption restricted mine access and forced the processing of lower-grade material
Individually, the production losses remain manageable but, collectively, they reduce the market’s ability to replace the copper now being withdrawn from warehouses, just as copper’s demand stack broadens:
The physical market is moving first
LME copper traded near $13,600 per tonne on Monday July 20, approximately 9% higher since the beginning of the year. Comex copper rose to around $6.35 per pound, less than 5% below its early-June record.
Yet macroeconomic uncertainty is mitigating the futures price from fully reflecting the deterioration in physical availability, as concerns over global growth, interest rates, geopolitical tensions and US tariff policy continue to constrain investor positioning.
However, China’s import premium is telling a different story, with the move from US$20 to US$100 per tonne, alongside an 80% decline in Shanghai inventories since March, is more than routine volatility. It is a warning that consumers are competing for a smaller volume of immediately available copper.
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Congo approves rail deal after US$753 million Lobito Corridor financing
The Democratic Republic of Congo has approved a partnership with Portugal’s Mota-Engil to rehabilitate the Congolese section of the Lobito Corridor, moving the US-backed rail project closer to the copper and cobalt mines it was built to reach.
The approval, endorsed by Congo’s government on July 10, covers a “complete rehabilitation” of the rail line linking the Angolan border with mining hubs including Kolwezi, Tenke and Lubumbashi, according to cabinet meeting minutes, with Mota-Engil and the Congolese government are negotiating a 30-year operating agreement.
The decision lands days after the US International Development Finance Corporation and Development Bank of Southern Africa reached financial close on a US$753 million package for Lobito Atlantic Railway, the concessionaire on the Angolan side. The financing includes a US$553 million, 15-year DFC senior secured loan and a US$200 million DBSA facility to upgrade the 1,300km railway from Lobito to Luau, on the DRC border, plus the mineral terminal at Lobito.
“The Lobito Corridor is fast becoming one of the most important trade routes for vital copper metal and other critical minerals required for our planet’s energy transition. The annual export capacity of the Lobito Corridor is expected to reach over 1 million tonnes within 5 years” — Robert Friedland, Founder, Ivanhoe Mines
“Reaching financial close on the Lobito Corridor Railway Project is the culmination of years of work and a defining moment for infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This transaction demonstrates that complex, multi-lender, cross-border project financings can be structured and successfully closed on the continent” — Nuno Gil, Founding Partner of Eaglestone
The Lobito corridor in central Africa is an ambitious project of 2,600km of railway linking copper mines in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to Angola’s Lobito port on the Atlantic coast, with an estimated cost of $US6-8 billion.
The latest news means the railway project is moving past diplomacy to financing for the Angolan trunk line and political clearance for the Congolese link.
The copper belt in central Africa — about 450km long and 260km wide — runs from Luanshya, Zambia into the Katanga region of DRC. It is estimated to contain more than one tenth of the world’s copper deposits.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, estimated to have the seventh largest reserves of copper, overtook Peru to become the world’s second largest producer of copper in 2023. And Zambia (the ninth largest copper producer in the world and second largest producer in Africa after DRC), found “one of the world’s biggest high-grade large copper mines” earlier this year, according to KoBold Metals, a metals exploration company, who discovered the deposit and is backed by Bill Gates and Sam Altman. The country hopes to increase output to 1 million tons by 2026 and 3 million tons by 2031.
Lobito Atlantic Railway, a Trafigura and Mota-Engil venture, has operated the Angolan corridor under a 30-year concession since 2024 and moved more than 200,000 tonnes of cargo in 2025, GTR reported. Volumes are expected to rise as upgrades proceed.
The Lobito Corridor has been promoted by Washington as a trade-focused model for Africa, with US officials presenting it as a way to tie infrastructure, regional integration and critical minerals together as a counter to Chinese mining investment in the region.
The latest approvals confirm our view that, yes, the “Copper Express” will leave the station. The question is how much copper will it be carrying?
Find out more:
Copper output at Chile’s top producers falls 18% in May
Chile’s state-owned Codelco produced 106,300 tonnes of copper in May 2026, down 18.3% from a year earlier, while BHP-operated Escondida fell 17.6% to 108,800 tonnes and Collahuasi dropped 19.3% to 31,000 tonnes.
The fall in output from the world’s largest copper producer exposes a broader global supply problem just as demand from power grids, electrification and AI infrastructure raises copper’s strategic value — showing up across mature ore bodies, complex processing circuits and large operations where even small disruptions can move the market:
Major copper supply under pressure
| Producer / asset | Latest official result | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Codelco, Chile | May output fell 18.3% y/y to 106,300 tonnes, according to Cochilco’s monthly mine-by-company copper production data | Cochilco supports the production drop, but not a mine-specific cause. Avoid “operational strain” unless separately sourced |
| Escondida, Chile | May output fell 17.6% y/y to 108,800 tonnes in Cochilco data; BHP’s nine-month output to March fell 3% to 949,300 tonnes in its operational review | BHP cited lower concentrator feed grade, partly offset by record mined material and concentrator throughput |
| Collahuasi, Chile | May output fell 19.3% y/y to 31,000 tonnes in Cochilco data | For broader context, Glencore said its attributable Collahuasi output fell 28% in 2025 due to mine sequencing, complex ore with lower recoveries, and water constraints in its 2025 production report |
| Pampa Norte / Spence, Chile | BHP’s nine-month output to March fell 19% to 158,100 tonnes, and FY2026 guidance was cut to 210,000-220,000 tonnes in its operational review | BHP cited ore complexity, declining grades and reduced recoveries |
| Freeport-McMoRan, Indonesia | Freeport’s Q1 copper production fell to 662 million lb from 868 million lb; Indonesia output fell to 95 million lb from 296 million lb in Freeport’s Q1 results | Freeport cited lower operating rates after the September 2025 mud-rush incident at PTFI and delays to the Grasberg Block Cave ramp-up |
| Glencore, global | Glencore’s own-sourced copper output fell 11% in 2025 to 851,600 tonnes in its full-year production report | Glencore cited lower head grades and recoveries tied to mine sequencing and ore feedstock |
There are offsets, but they are not enough to erase the risk. BHP’s Antamina output in Peru rose 19% in the nine months to March, while Copper South Australia rose 3%, helped by stronger operating performance at Olympic Dam, Prominent Hill and Carrapateena.
Counterweight supply
| Producer / asset | Latest official result | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Glencore, global | Q1 2026 copper output rose 19% y/y to 199,600 tonnes in its Q1 production report | Glencore cited improved African copper grades and higher throughput and grades at Antamina, showing some 2025 supply weakness is reversing |
| Antamina, Peru | Glencore’s attributable Antamina copper production rose 41% y/y in Q1 2026 in its Q1 production report | The increase reflected mine sequencing into higher copper and lower zinc ore grades |
| Ivanhoe / Kamoa-Kakula, DRC | Kamoa-Kakula produced 64,328 tonnes of copper in Q2 2026 and maintained 2026 guidance at 290,000-330,000 tonnes in Ivanhoe’s July 8 update | This should not be described as “guidance deferred” on current official sourcing; Ivanhoe says H2 output should rise on higher mining rates and inventory destocking |
The problem is that existing and planned mines are on track to meet only about 70% of global copper demand by 2035, as grids, data centres and electrification lift consumption.
According to HSBC Holdings Plc copper is facing a “super squeeze” (and other raw materials) is being driven by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and mine disruptions, colliding with rising consumption across data centers, electrification, and the defence industry.
“The longer the strait is closed, the more inventories are run down, the more likely it is that we reach ‘tipping points’ in the markets for some commodities,” say HSBC analysts in their report published June 1 report.
Our latest analysis on coppers new demand stack:
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Australia – India agree uranium export deal
- India and Australia have finalised the administrative arrangements for Australian uranium exports to India for exclusively peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards
- the arrangement sits under the 2015 Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and is designed to help India increase non-fossil fuel power capacity
- the uranium announcement came alongside a wider Australia-India defence and security declaration, including consultation on Indo-Pacific defence developments
- Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the nuclear agreement would “pave the way for uranium supplies from Australia to India”
Australia and India have agreed to enable long-term Australian uranium exports to India during Modi’s July 9 summit with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, finalising arrangements under the 2015 nuclear cooperation agreement for peaceful use under IAEA safeguards.
No volumes or delivery dates have been disclosed.
The deal gives Australia an additional market for its resources sector and gives India a trusted uranium supplier for its non-fossil power buildout, while tying energy security to a wider package on defence, critical minerals and Indo-Pacific supply chains.
Modi framed the agreement as a clean-energy move that would “pave the way for uranium supplies from Australia to India” and give India’s clean-energy objectives “fresh momentum.”
The significance of the deal is Australia’s positioning itself in the uranium market and as part of India’s long-term energy security mix (as well as working to diversify from China)
India is trying to turn nuclear from a small power source into a strategic energy pillar: the country has 7.9 GW of operable nuclear capacity and 6.0 GW under construction, but has set a target to reach at least 100 GW by 2047. That buildout depends on new reactors, small modular reactor development, private-sector participation, foreign technology and secure uranium supply.
And for Australia the deal’s importance lies in the contry’s complicated relationship with uranium, with states, such as Victoria and New South Wales, banning or heavily restricting uranium mining. And national legislation means uranium from Australia may only be exported for peaceful non-explosive purposes.
The uranium agreement was not announced in isolation.
In the same summit statement, the leaders linked energy cooperation with critical minerals, resilient supply chains and economic security. They also agreed to deepen defence cooperation, maritime security, cyber, critical technologies and supply-chain resilience.
That is the real significance. Uranium is becoming part of a wider trusted-supplier architecture.
Australia and India said they share a vision for a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Their defence declaration commits the two countries to consult on defence-related developments in the Indo-Pacific that affect shared interests, increase defence exercise complexity and expand interoperability.
Energy, in other words, is no longer separate from security.
Q&A
What is the India Australia uranium deal?
The India Australia uranium deal is an administrative arrangement enabling Australian uranium exports to India for exclusively peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards.
Why is the uranium deal significant?
It links uranium supply, energy security and non-fossil fuel power capacity, while strengthening the Australia-India strategic partnership.
Did Australia and India announce uranium shipment volumes?
No. The official summit statements confirmed the arrangement enabling long-term uranium exports, but did not disclose shipment volumes, pricing or delivery dates.
How does the uranium deal connect to Indo-Pacific security?
The uranium announcement came alongside a defence and security declaration covering Indo-Pacific consultation, defence exercises, interoperability and maritime cooperation.